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ABSTRACT
In scholarship on the Civil War there is generally a lack of emphasis placed
upon the significance of transatlantic diplomacy. However, much of the literature
that is devoted to this subject does little to draw the importance of diplomatic and
domestic histories together. This thesis uses British Foreign Office papers to
discuss the role of Her majesty’s consuls, and the importance of resident persons
of British nativity, especially within the Confederacy, during the war. It argues
that the struggle between the Union and the new Confederacy affected diplomatic
relations not only in the geo-political sense, but directly and personally through
the fate of foreign individuals residing within America. Political theory and the
semantics of ideology will be cross-examined against British, Confederate and
Union government documents and correspondence in order to develop a deeper
understanding of the flexibility and malleability of the concept of sovereignty,
and its role in Civil War diplomacy.

INDEX WORDS: American Civil War, Diplomacy, Britain, Consuls,
Sovereignty, State Rights.
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Introduction: “In a multitude of people is the glory of a king, but without a
people a prince is ruined”1

Scholars of Civil War diplomacy generally begin their books with
introductions highlighting the staggering enormity of published literature on the
Civil War, and commenting on the relative under-emphasis on questions of
diplomacy. America as a nation has tended to view itself as exceptional and set
apart. Likewise, American historians have often been guilty of divorcing
American history from wider trends in world history, as though ‘the last best hope
of mankind’ truly has evolved in a vacuum. It is no surprise therefore that the
central, most dramatic event in the American narrative, a war of Americans, by
Americans, for Americans, has rarely been placed in any international context.
With equal consistency, scholars of Civil War diplomacy have divorced the
international context of the war from its national significance. This thesis places
the Civil War in its rightful framework in American history, as an ‘irrepressible
conflict’ between political economies for control of the expanding nation state. It
also highlights the importance of transatlantic geo-politics and the recognition
issue.
However, the international context of the war involves significantly more than
simply the diplomacy of recognition. This thesis will argue that the national
meaning of the war and the significance of transatlantic diplomacy were
concurrent. The Republican controlled Federal Government and the Southern
Slavocracy fought for authority over individual citizens, while, as every

1

Proverbs 14: 28 (ESV).

2

diplomatic history of the war tells, the British Crown was determined to maintain
neutrality. If government authority is a question of individual citizens, then British
neutrality could not merely be a matter of direct intervention from without,
because the British Crown was present within America itself in the form of Her
Majesty’s subjects. This thesis will use consular correspondence to analyze the
ground-level reality of diplomacy in the Civil War, arguing that the struggle for
governmental hegemony over persons was far from an all-American affair.
Writing at the height of the geo-political impact of aggressive nationalism,
Carlton Hayes dismissed much myth and jingoism surrounding national identities
(such as geographical integrity, collective ‘soul’ or ‘national character’). Hayes
argued that languages create spaces for ‘social communication’, thus encouraging
unique identities to develop. As languages change, nationalities wax and wane.
However, through the nineteenth century, nationalist movements had unnaturally
manipulated transient nationalities to,
systematically indoctrinate with the tenets that every human being owes his first
and last duty to his nationality, that nationality is an ideal unit of political
organization as well as the actual embodiment of cultural distinction, and that in
the final analysis all other human loyalties must be subordinate to loyalty to the
national state.2

Oskar Janowsky followed Hayes’ work with analysis of the problem of
minority nationalities in European states, concluding that the idea that nation
states need borders matching lines of cultural homogeneity is flawed and
dangerous. Multi-ethnic states and empires are the norm in history, being
empirically more logical and natural. Janosky believed, “national federalism
offers a means of harmonizing the otherwise contradictory requirements of

3

national freedom and economic unity”. He warned that conflict invariably results
from attempts by one ‘cultural nationality’ to seize and dominate the state to the
exclusion of minorities.3
Karl Deutsch built upon Janosky’s arguments in his work, Nationalism and
Social Communication. Deutsch argued that nationality is comprised of culturally
based ‘communities’ within which ideas and experiences are more easily shared
and understood between community members than with outsiders. In
contradistinction, ‘societies’ are areas of interdependent labor and economic
exchange and can include multiple ‘communities’; no state is by any means
dependent upon concurrent borders for ‘societies’ and ‘communities’. Nationalism
is therefore an attempt by a narrow leadership class, an external ‘community’, or a
single internal ‘community’, to gain ascendancy in a ‘society’.4
Hans Kohn argued that the individualistic, humanitarian revolutions
responding to men of letters like Rousseau created liberal states. However, Central
European movements of dominant principalities or ethnicities, in which group
identity and exclusivism surpassed individual rights in national state ideologies,
corrupted these ideas of nation. Nation states therefore came to depend for their
force upon, “nationalism… a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the
individual is felt to be due to the nation state”.5
K R Minogue considered Nationalism to be largely comprised of attempts to
turn manufactured states (especially postcolonial states) into nations by emulating

2

Carlton Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (NYC: MacMillan, 1941), p. 6.
Oskar Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (NYC: MacMillan, 1945), p. 166.
4
Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of
Nationality (Boston: MIT Press, 1953). See introduction and chapter 1.
5
Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (NYC: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1965), p. 9.
3

4

the relatively homogeneous imperial states of France and England. Minogue
argued that since the Treaty of Versailles, leaders of new governments have
sought to establish hegemony through superimposed or manipulated identities.
Though he referred to a much later period, Minogue’s conclusions cannot but
evoke memories of the American Civil War; “The most obvious feature of
Nationalism in the Afro-Asian world is very often at that there is no nation at
all…. Arrived at independence, such countries are in danger of falling apart”.6
Benedict Anderson’s resoundingly influential study Imagined Communities
placed intellectual changes in post-enlightenment Europe and the advent of print
culture at the center of national identity. A reconceptualization of time as linear
allowed people groups to see themselves as unique sub-histories in the human
progression, while print culture increased the use of vernacular thus creating
culturally centered spaces for the exchange of ideas. Newly perceived
communities then gradually became tied to government apparatus and territories,
to the exclusion of communities imagined to be ‘foreign’.7
Finally, Montserrat Guibernau differentiated between state nationalism, which
uses culture and mythology to create authority based on citizen participation, and
minority nationalism, comprised of ethical counter claims of homogeneous subcultures for their own states.8
These scholars each share a fundamental understanding that the ebb-and-flow
of history makes, unmakes, and remakes the distinct cultural groups which we call

6

K. R. Minogue, Nationalism (NYC: Basic Books, 1967), 29.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism. 2nd ed. (NYC: Verso, 1991).
8
Montserrat Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalisms in the Twentieth
Century (NYC: Polity press, 1996).
7

5

‘nations’. Such groups have often co-existed within empires or states, but through
activist, aggressive and ideological processes they can assert themselves over and
against others to dominate existing states, or create new breakaway ones. Such
movements provoke conflicts over governments which culture alone rarely
creates. Nationalist movements are therefore struggles for or between ‘politicaleconomies’.
In 1990, Richard Bensel authored Yankee Leviathan, a history of the
Republican-led, activist growth of centralized authority through the Civil War and
Reconstruction. Leading Republican William Seward coined the term
‘irrepressible conflict’ in 1858. Seward did not mean certain war but that, “by
continued appliance of patronage and threats of disunion (Southerners) will keep a
majority favorable to their designs in the senate… annex foreign slaveholding
states… and repeal the Act of 1808”. Bensel traced Republican anti-slavery
ideology from the party’s inception, through speeches, motions and congressional
bills of an increasingly assertive and threatening (towards the Southern slaveeconomy) nature. With revealing statistics on voting trends in the 36th Congress
(the last antebellum Congress) and the 1860 census, Bensel went farther than most
similarly minded scholars to argue that secession was essentially rational. It was,
from the Southern perspective, a wholly justified last option for survival. Bensel
denied that the vast areas of unexploited land in the Deep South meant that slavery
did not need to expand. He emphasized the importance of the inter-state slave

6

trade, without which slavery on the seaboard “would soon have developed
pathological traits”.9
Bensel highlighted the complex and intricate divisions woven by slavery that
went beyond cotton economies. America’s largest free black populations lived in
the cities of the Chesapeake. Where industrial development and Northern
investment were highest, the rigid racial mores and boundaries of slave society
were most blurred. Southerners knew that if slavery could not extend west, and
industry continued to extend south, the South would become full of cities, which
in turn would be full of Free Blacks. Of the six major platforms for development
in the 36th Congress (the Union-Pacific Railroad, waterway improvement,
Morrill’s college land grant, water traffic reform, tariff walls and a Homestead
Act) five took the vast majority of their support from Northern Republicans. No
other party proved as able to commit to the defense of a clear and strong program.
Partisan splits between Northern and Southern Democrats, Union Party men and
the dying American Party nullified any attempts at opposition compromise.
Southern Democrats resisted these platforms, almost all of which waited until
after secession to pass, but they could not form a coalition to oppose the
Republicans who held the largest minority. The South was doomed to defeat
against the central plank of Republican American Nationalism: “the ideologically
justified insistence that the resources of the central state be mobilized in support
of the dominant group”.10

9

Richard Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America 1859-1877
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 21; Ibid., p. 27.
10
Ibid., p. 63.
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Eugene Genovese’s seminal text The Political Economy of Slavery captured
this sense of panic, and explained the innate need of the slave economy to expand
ever westward to virgin lands in an economic vacuum, where dynamic competing
economies would be excluded. As the less progressive, less powerful economy,
slavery could not afford to take the back seat in the national political state.11 Allan
Nevins’ War for the Union described in detail the results of the war which had
placed these two political economies in direct conflict. By the end of the war, an
extensively centralized Union depended upon extended communications
networks, benefited from expanded government agencies, and had a united
economy of industry and urbanization. This Union secured the confidence of the
world through the established “perpetuity of its government and institutions”.
Through triumph in war, the national narrative was born and projected back onto
history.12
Kenneth Stampp argued in his book The Era of Reconstruction that the
historiographical view of the Dunning school, which called Reconstruction a
travesty and inhumanity, was grounded in nationalism. The religiously motivated
Radicals who demonstrated faith in black self-government and urged continued
support for reconstruction of Southern race relations became a disruptive force to
the mainstream of accommodationists, who only wanted to secure economic

11

Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the
Slave South (NYC: Vintage Books, 1967).
12
Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Organized War to Victory 1864-1865, His The
Ordeal of the Union, 8 vols. (NYC: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959-1971), 8 (1971); James Wilson
argued that expansion and imperialism were woven innately into the fabric of the American
republic. He wrote of President James Polk, “Polk did not care about the North’s caution and
humanitarianism; nor was he worried about… protecting slavery. He simply wanted as much land
as possible”. James Wilson, The Imperial Republic: A Structural History of American
Constitutionalism from the Colonial Era to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate, 2002), p. 199.

8

priorities in the former Confederacy. The tide of Anglo-Saxonism dominated the
late nineteenth century, glorifying both Blue and Grey and thereby necessitating a
vilification of agitators. “In an era of intense nationalism, both Northerners and
Southerners agreed that the preservation of the Union was essential to American
interests”. Such views depended directly upon the ascension of one political
economy to the national throne.13
The view that the Civil War allowed an industrial economy which had been
gathering momentum for decades to control the nation state was first clearly
articulated by the anti-Trust, Progressive historians Charles and Mary Beard in the
inter-war era. Beard saw Lincoln’s 1860 platform as the culmination of the
antebellum competition between the sections. Having learnt in 1856 that merely
guaranteeing the expulsion of slavery from the territories could not secure
election, the Republicans expanded their platform to include greater tariff
protection for Eastern industry and a Homestead Act for Middle-Western
agriculture. According to the Beards, these policies aimed to establish one section
of the nation as the dominant, definitive one.14
The Beards’ work was added to by Charles’ protégé at Columbia, Louis
Hacker, who became progressively more Marxist in his determinist reading of the
class-based structure of US history. Both scholars praised the anti-industrial
tendencies of agrarianism, and for two decades, aided by the Depression, the focus
of American history became the defeated Jeffersonian-Jacksonian-Democrat
progression, rather than the Whiggish-Republican paradigm, which had dominated

13

Kenneth Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction 1865-1877 (NYC: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 14.
Charles Beard and Mary Beard, A Basic History of the United States (NYC: Garden City books,
1944), chapters 16-17.
14

9

since the Civil War. In the Beard-Hacker thesis, the Civil War is a ‘second
American Revolution’. The first rejected mercantilist suppression of industry; the
second overthrew the agrarian bloc, which had prevented unrestrained growth.15
There are many other aspects of causality worthy of consideration in the Civil
War era, and historians have placed morality, race, gender, pure political theory,
and many other forces at the center of the debate. However, the expansion and
‘irrepressible conflict’ of competing political economies is impossible to ignore.
The Republican Party was itself formed from reactions to the 1854 KansasNebraska Act. Just as the shock of Lincoln’s election precipitated secession, it had
been the shock of Kansas-Nebraska which had led Lincoln to re-enter public life.
Southern abandonment of the Clay-Webster compromise brought a realization that
slavery was not a benign, fading institution, but a malignant, aggressive political
force. Ever since the war sealed complete victory for the North and the destruction
of the political economy of slavery, the idea of competing economies has been a
perennial tool for analyzing the Civil War and Reconstruction.
As well as indirect assaults from historians who do not consider the Civil War
to have been a fundamentally economic conflict, the Beard-Hacker thesis faced
direct assault from the ‘New Economic Historians’ of the 1960s and1970s. In
Ralph Andreano’s edited collection of essays Victor Clarke claimed that the
increased growth of the war era was merely the cyclical economy, “rallying from
the 1857 depression” and that war production was barely above normal level.
Stanley Coben had previously questioned the Beardian view of a united,

15

Thomas Pressly, Americans Interpret their Civil War, paperback edition (NYC: Freepress, 1964;
Origional edition Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 227-226, “The Second
American Revolution”.
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unwavering Northern program of exploitation. He highlighted divisions between
heavy industry in the mid-Atlantic, exporting industries in New England,
commerce in New York, and the agrarian West over tariff barriers, specie
payment and various other issues. Later, Susan Lee and Peter Passall placed
emphasis on the masses of unexploited Southern land, arguing that Slavery was
far from moribund. They called secession, “hardly justifiable”. They also cited
extensive statistics to prove that industrial output had declined in the war. They
argued the war had been essentially pre-modern and “was not fought with iron and
steel”.16
However, revisionist criticisms that the Beards’ lack of sophistication and the
narrow prominence of their anti-trust Progressivism met with plenty of
sophisticated counter-critiques. Jeffery Williamson highlighted the post-war
policy of prioritizing bondholders with government specie payments, to the
exclusion of retiring greenbacks. Combined with a tariff wall, protecting heavy
industrial produce, and a regressive tax structure, which “shift(ed) the costs from
the producers to the consumers”, this allowed peacetime growth and output to
quickly exceed 1850s levels. Concurrently, real wages remained static, as price
rises and wage-increases kept parity.17
Ultimately however, the debates inspired by the New Economic Historians
proved only that statistics can be creatively interpreted and are rarely conclusive.

16

Victor Clarke “Manufacturing development during the Civil War,” in The Economic Impact of
the Civil War, ed. Ralph Andreno, (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman, 1962), p. 41-48; Stanley
Coben, “Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Re-examination,” Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, 46 (June 1959): pp. 67-90; Susan P Lee and Peter Passall, A New
Economic View of American History (NYC: W. W. Norton and Co., 1979), chapter 10 “Economics
and the Coming of the Civil War”, and chapter 11 “The Economic Impact of the Civil War”.
17
Jeffery Williamson “Watersheds and turning points: Conjectures on the long-term impact of
Civil War financing,” Journal of Economic History 34 (September 1974): pp. 636-661.
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While the Beards certainly were no economic statisticians, their identity as
Progressive thinkers remains the strength of their work. In the long view, the most
crucial fruit of the war was the exclusion of the political economy of slavery from
the expanding nation. This sectional victory of centralization paved the road for
the all-powerful Trusts of the Beards’ day. The growth of a strong central
government is certainly a well-corroborated idea.
In Lincoln and the War Governors, William Hesseltine compared the growth of
Federal power in the war with contrary patterns in the South concluding, “State
Rights crippled the Confederacy… while Lincoln’s government effectively
crippled the states”. The war was not only a matter of Federal victory over the
Southern States, but over the idea of state sovereignty absolutely. Raoul Berger
argued in Government by Judiciary that the Civil War amendments were in no
wise motivated by concerns for black citizens, but rather by Radical Republican
determination that, “the Constitution be amended… as to secure permanent
ascendancy” for themselves. Taking a more positive view of the 13th amendment,
Herman Belz claimed that, the establishment of dual Federal and State citizenship,
though limited, was an exercise of “concurrent sovereignty”. It was the first time
since ratification that the federal machinery had acted as sovereign within the
states.18
Scholars of nationalist movements invariably emphasize the centrality of
imagery, emotional appeal, myths, and historical interpretations in national

18

William Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (NYC: Alfred A Knopf, 1948), p. 274;
Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Boston: Harvard Press, 1977), p. 16; Herman Belz, A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican
Party and Freedmen’s Civil Rights 1861 to 1866 (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1976), p.
133.
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struggles. Unsurprisingly, the ideological substance of the Civil War provides
strong support for the conclusion that the war was fundamentally a battle of
political economies. David Potter, in his book Lincoln and his Party in the
Secession Crisis, shifted the focus away from Southern responses to the
Republican Party, towards Republican responses to secession. He argued that
secession was a shock because Northerners, including Lincoln, had believed
national unity to be stronger than it had proved. This shock allowed the Radical,
centralizing ideological platform to answer the need that secession revealed.
Leonard Curry, discussing the 37th Congress in Blueprint for Modern America,
highlighted the social and political fluidity of American civilization as it moved
steadily westward. However, he pointed out that while many antebellum Senators
represented States they had not been born in, “the line between the slave and nonslave areas had become an impassable barrier” in this regard. After decades of
standoff between two mutually isolated blocs, the Civil War Congress, free of the
Slavocracy, took upon itself powers which, according to Senate leader Fessenden,
were “possessed by no other (government) on earth short of despotism”.19
Eric Foner described how each conflicting sectional ideology had, by 1860,
come to view itself as “fundamentally well ordered, and the other as both the
negation of its most cherished values and a threat to its existence”. Discussing
Lincoln’s reverence for ‘the American dream’ Gabor Boritt went a step further
and claimed that Lincoln viewed the Union not as an end, as is generally asserted
by historians, but as a vessel. The Union was a ship carrying the economy of

19

David Potter, Lincoln and his Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale Press, 1967);
Leonard Curry, Blueprint for modern America: Non-Military Legislation of the First Civil War
Congress (Nashville: Vanderbilt Press, 1968), p. 23; Ibid,. p. 251.
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opportunity. It was an America where a frontier log-splitter could earn the highest
office. Contrasting the ideology of ‘free labor’ with ‘the menace of labor in
chains’ Boritt claimed that Lincoln was personally committed to emancipation.
Boritt believed Lincoln would even have abandoned a Union which threatened
‘upward mobility’ by nationalizing the political economy of slavery.20
The Civil War was therefore an intensely ideological struggle, but one over a
very real power. Lincoln infused his speeches with this ideology, but they were
not abstract. The real focus of reasserting the central authority of a nation over its
reluctant peripheries was always visible behind the romantic rhetoric of unity and
freedom. Before the New Jersey House of Representatives February 21 1861,
Lincoln referred to himself as “the representative of the majesty of the people of
the United States”. Furthermore, he committed himself to, “take the ground I
deem most just to the North, the East, the West, the South, the whole country”.21
As a lawyer, Lincoln was keenly aware of the necessity of majority rule, and the
acceptance by minorities of laws they opposed in principle. “Unanimity is
impossible”, he declared in his first inaugural address, “Rule of the minority as a
permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that rejecting the majority
principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left”.22
Lincoln’s differentiation between despotism and majoritarianism is interesting
and the concept is central to the philosophy of ‘authority’, which is the necessary
force behind every sovereign government. Speaking at the White House April 11
20

Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The ideology of the Republican Party before the
Civil War (NYC: Oxford Press, 1970) p. 9; Gabor Boritt, Lincoln and the Economics of the
America Dream (Memphis: MSU Press, 1978), chapter 13 “In the Shadow of Slavery”, and
chapter 19 “Watchman, What of the Night?”
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1865, in his last public address, Lincoln summed up the whole purpose of the war
and his simple priorities for reconstruction. He stated, “we all agree that the
seceded states, so called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union,
and the sole object of government… is to again get them into that proper relation”.
According to nationalist thought, this proper state was one in which majority laws,
though hated, resented and rejected in principle by every man of the minority, are
internalized and justified simply by being. Destroying a rebellion of states was
obviously the first necessary step in establishing this state of affairs, but majority
rule truly depends upon the authority of sovereign governments over citizens as
individuals, not sections.23
In his classic treatise on the political science of sovereignty, Bertrand de
Jouvenel argued that the origination of sovereignty is personal. It is inherent in
even the smallest, most isolated society, for true ‘authority’ is simply the ability to
convince others to follow. Sovereign governments rest not on the idea of social
contract and complicity in every act of government, but on a majority acceptance
of the right to rule, thus making citizenship obligatory. “Nothing matters more to
the well being of states”, Jouvenel summated, “than that there should be
unchanging agreement as to the identity of the sovereign”. Sovereign governments
need a measure of co-operation, or at least majority goodwill and minority
acceptance. Here the lines of contractual theory and authoritarianism meet,
because, “the capacity of an authority to work injury to some of its subjects rests

21

Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, ed. Roy Baker, (NYC: World Publishing co.,
1946) p. 576.
22
Ibid., p. 585.
23
Abraham Lincoln: Selected Speeches, Messages and Writings, ed. Harry Williams (NYC: Holt,
Reinhart and Winston, 1957), p. 288.
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wholly and exclusively on the essential advantages conferred upon an aggregate”.
True sovereignty needs to establish individual complicity even to the extent that
citizens willingly accept programs which are to their personal detriment, such as
unequal taxation or tariff walls. This was exactly the kind of internalization the
antebellum South lacked.24
Linda Kerber’s book, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies, argued for five
fundamental, contractual obligations of citizenship in a modern state: to be loyal,
to not be vagrant, to pay taxes, jury duty, and military service. Kerber defined
obligation as, “the means by which the state can use its power to constrain the
freedoms of individual citizens”. She argued that there is no admittance to the
rights and blessings of a state without an active, participatory discharging of
citizens’ duties. “In this book I use (‘obligation’) in its primary sense- to be
bound, to be constrained, to be under compulsion”.25
John Simmons stated in the 2002 Blackwell guide to Social and Political
Philosophy that, “States claim rights over their subjects, … rights against aliens,
… and rights over a particular geographical territory”. It was over these three
central rights of states that the Civil War was fought, in order to decide absolute
and final sovereignty in America. Secession was an attempt to resist the
dominance of the political economy of freedom. It was not however a negation of
the principle of governmental authority or the obligations of citizenship.26

24

Bertrand de Jouvenel., Sovereignty: An Enquiry into the Political Good. trans. J. F. Huntington
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 5; Ibid., p. 24.
25
Linda Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship
(NYC: Hill and Wang, 1998), p. xxi.
26
Robert L. Simon, ed. The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy, Blackwell
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In her consideration of The Dynamic of Secession Viva Bartkus argued that
‘distinct communities’ continually measure the fluctuating costs and benefits of
‘membership’ in the original state, and of secession from it. Bartkus claimed that
distinct communities are not invariably set upon independence, but upon defense
and perpetuation of their integral community identity. Secession results when a
community feels it can no longer defend its identity within a state. Allen
Buchanan’s summary of the morality of secession and subsequent countersecessionist coercion similarly concluded that secession is drastic, rare, and even
more rarely logically justifiable. Occasions where there are no realistic
alternatives to secession are not common. Buchanan viewed the American
Revolution and Southern secession as alike, stating that in both cases, “the rules of
the political game, particularly the rules governing representation, worked to the
groups’ disadvantage” with no likelihood of change outside of secession.27
Both Buchanan and Bartkus viewed secession as a last measure, when all
attempts to preserve a group’s interests within a state have failed, to create a new
state. It is therefore very rare for secession to be the end of a revolution because
both external coercion and internal crisis of identity are likely to result. The
original state usually resists the denial which secession makes of its sovereign
status, while secession itself creates a void and must go on to replace the
government that has been rejected, to literally re-place sovereignty.
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Emory Thomas’ study of The Confederate Nation viewed the histories of the
war and the Confederate counter-state as concurrent. Confederate leaders at
Richmond sought to manipulate antebellum sectional identity by using military
songs, stories of battles and myths of hero-generals as the short lived icons of an
abortive national identity. George Rable recounted the history of The Confederate
Republic in terms of its political culture. He viewed the Confederate Constitution
as innovative, springing from Southern anti-party political ideology. A six year,
one term executive office, divorced from patronage; presidential authority to
originate financial bills; and allowing the cabinet to participate in Congressional
debate aimed to create truly national, non-partisan leadership and embody a new
nation. Prohibitions on the fanfare of political campaigning resulted partly in
confusion and isolation of the masses from politics, but also created a distinct
national ideology lending much valuable cohesion to the Confederate
experiment.28
Other commentators have viewed the Confederate glass more as half empty
than half full. Paul Escott argued that the elitist class structure of Southern society
was incapable of sustaining revolution and providing the stable basis of an
alternative nation state. The disfranchised yeomanry, who had enjoyed great
personal freedom in the antebellum upcountry, soon came to resent the unequal
burdens of war; “Planters had no unifying goal in mind and little inclination to
seek one”. Many other historians view the root cause of Confederate failure to be
their inescapable Americanism. Kermit Hall and James Ely argued that
innovations in the Confederate Constitution were actually part of established
28
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American trends, and were often prophetic of future change. The Cold War for
example, “perpetuated fascination with the idea of a patriot President… pursuing
national interests”. Desire for a one term President, the necessity of increasing
executive fiscal power, and disgust with corrupt pork-barreling and partisan
patronage, were all prominent ideas in American politics both sides of the war.29
Whether Confederate nationalism had any genuine appeal and why exactly it
failed is relatively unimportant. What is significant is the observation that
secession and war inspired the same trends of centralization and an ideologically
imperative quest for sovereignty over the individual citizen in both sections. These
imperatives were grounded in the nature of the American Revolution and the
Constitution, which removed sovereign rule from its center in London, without
conclusively reestablishing it in the Union’s new federal apparatus. Conflict can
never be resolved without an unquestioned arbitrator, a sovereign force of law.
Due to the ambiguous constitution both secession and the federal reaction were
reasonably justifiable and legally grounded.
Gordon Wood’s history of The Creation of the America Republic discussed at
length the process of deciding the rightful, sole sovereign of the colonies. The Lt.
Governor of Massachusetts Thomas Hutchinson, said in 1773, “I know of no line
that can be drawn between the supreme authority of parliament and the total
independence of the colonies; it is impossible that there be two legislatures in one
and the same state”. Many colonials who distrusted of British rule shared this
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conviction. Whig leader James Wilson said in 1776, “The same collective body
cannot delegate the same powers to two distinct representative bodies”.30
The colonies successfully rejected British sovereignty, but no sooner had one
unpopular government been cast off than the people began to lose faith in their
own representatives. Wood described a period of mass unrest in which many
States experienced animated public activity. Radical mobs would gather at
legislative sessions, or in county conventions, and give direct instructions, issue
by issue, to their representatives. Responding to such radical interference in
Massachusetts in 1778 the Worcester committee asserted, “It is as wrong to refuse
obedience to the laws made by our representatives as it would be to break laws
made by ourselves”. Of necessity, America eventually established these principles
in Constitutional government and representative authority. The rule of law came
to define the republic. What was less clear was to which governmental authority a
citizen owed his final loyalty; his state, or the Union beyond it?31
In 1860 debate on the perpetuity and purpose of the Union was as old as the
Union itself. Every argument for or against perpetuity had an obvious, equally
constitutionally grounded counter argument. Kenneth Stampp pointed out the
dangerous ground upon which Lincoln stood when he claimed the Constitution
had superseded the Union of the Articles by making it ‘more perfect’. The Articles
had also claimed perpetuity. Could not now the Confederates claim that their new
Union surpassed the United States Constitution in perfection, thereby nullifying
it? Stampp claimed that even national politicians had hesitated to view the Union
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as an end in itself before the infusion of rising European nationalist ideology in
the1830s. Most viewed it rather as John Randolph did, as “the means of securing
the safety, liberty and welfare of the confederacy”.32
Harold Hyman, the prolific constitutional historian, quoted many British
commentators on the Constitutional crisis of Civil War. Notably Walter Bagehot,
editor of the Economist, felt that, “the framers should have adopted Hamilton’s
idea and made the states mere municipalities…(making) war by secession
impossible”. Though Hyman believed the Constitution proved itself adequate to
defend and maintain national life, he admitted that the Civil War was necessary in
order to finish the work of the Philadelphia Convention.33
In Arthur Bestor’s analysis, constitutional conflicts are deeper than ordinary
politics. “Controversies begin to cut deep, therefore, the constitutional legitimacy
of a given course of action is likely to be challenged”. Through the 1850s-1870s
American politics went beyond disputes between opposing programs and
redefined American government entirely. Bestor argued that due to America’s
deep commitment to the Constitution, many of the options other nation states
might have chosen to prevent sectional conflict were simply unavailable. The
American Constitution allowed for blocks and checks which would prevent either
a simple majority vote to enact abolition or violent the violent prohibition of an
expansion of slave territory. Against the grain of most scholarship, Bestor argued
that the Free Soilers were not proposing any expansion of the scope of the
Constitution. The Constitution gave Congress absolute power over ‘interstate
32
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commerce’, which logically included the internal slave trade. Therefore, in not
simply banning slave movement across state boundaries outright, Congress had
always acted conservatively.34
Bestor concluded that there were four constitutional schools of thought on
slavery. Firstly, the Clayite compromisers, who backed congressional authority in
the territories but advocated using it for compromise along the line of the 1820
compromise. Secondly, there were the Douglas Democrats who practically denied
congressional authority and left sovereignty in local hands, even in the Territories,
which had no logical claim to state sovereignty. Then there were the Free Soilers,
who proposed positive use of Congressional authority to back territorial exclusion.
Finally, the Fire-Eaters of the Robert Barnwell-Rhett School advocated a positive
use of Congressional authority to defend and extend slavery. The Civil War was a
constitutional conflict between the latter two of these schools. Bestor believed that
constitutional questions formed the substance of this conflict, “This brings us face
to face with the central paradox of the Civil War crisis. Slavery was being
attacked in places where it did not, in present, actually exist”. Further, the
Constitution created the parameters for war. When the South seceded, thanks to
American constitutional framework, the states had intricate and developed
governmental machinery with which to unite in a new confederacy, and to utilize
in the coming struggle.
In the antebellum Republic, there was a marked failure by both the political
economies of slavery and freedom to gain the full and final authority theoretically
33
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granted by the Constitution. This absence of ascendancy, and the resultant
controversies between the Free-Soil and Fire-Eater schools, proves that the
Constitution was a national space waiting to be filled. It was the spoils of victory
in a conflict with a continuous history reaching back to the HamiltonianJeffersonian paradigm.
However, if the Civil War was a constitutional struggle for authority and
sovereignty over individual citizens, it was complicated further by America’s
large population of non-native born residents. Large numbers of people migrated
to America for work and land, and when the Civil War gripped the continent, it
inevitably swept thousands of these men up into its course.

Table 1: Figures from the Eighth United States census for all persons giving their
nativity as British35
State
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
34

English
1174
375
12227
8875
1581
320
1122
41745
9304
11522
1400
4503
3989
2677
4235
23848
25743

Scots
669
131
3670
2546
200
189
431
10540
2093
2895
377
1111
1051
759
1583
6855
5705

Welsh
11
10
1262
176
30
6
56
1528
226
913
163
420
97
88
701
320
348

Irish
5664
1312
33147
55445
5832
827
6586
87573
24495
28072
3888
22249
28207
15290
24872
185434
30049

British
America
239
154
5437
3145
39
77
178
20132
3166
8313
986
618
830
17540
333
27069
36482

Total
Britons
7757
1828
55743
70187
7682
1419
8373
161518
39284
51715
6814
28901
34174
36354
31724
243526
98327

Total State
(free white)
population
256081
324143
358110
451504
90589
77747
591550
1704291
1338710
673779
106390
919484
357456
626947
515918
1221432
736142

Arthur Bestor, “The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis,” American Historical
Review 69 (January 1964): pp. 327-352.
35
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Joseph Kennedy (NYC: Ross Publishing, 1990). See statistical recapitulation.
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Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Wis Wisconsin

3462
844
10009

1079
385
2021

422
21
305

12831
3893
43464

8023
184
2814

25817
5327
58613

169395
353899
1063489

2291
15852
106011
729
32700
690
46546
6356
757
2001
1695
1632
4104
30543

741
3556
27641
637
6535
217
10137
1517
502
577
524
1078
1386
6902

14
371
7998
20
8365
32
13101
19
11
86
48
384
584
6454

12737
62006
498072
809
76826
1266
201939
25258
4906
12498
3480
13480
16501
49961

4468
1144
55273
48
7082
663
3484
2830
86
387
458
15776
389
18146

20251
81785
649995
2243
131508
2868
275207
35980
6262
21811
6205
32350
22964
112006

325579
646699
3831590
629942
2302808
52160
2849259
170649
291300
826722
420891
314693
1047299
773693

Historians often note that many immigrants, especially Irish and German,
fought in Union colors. It is less often remembered that many foreign-born men
also fought in Grey. In 1940, Ella Lonn, the first female president of the Southern
Historical Association, published a tirelessly researched work, Foreigners in the
Confederacy. Lonn’s research found many Southern companies serving either as
Confederate, State or Home Guard troops which were entirely or majority foreign
born, the majority being British (including Irish) or German. Her appendix listed
25 companies in Alabama, 8 in Georgia, 48 in Louisiana (and 15 more formed
only for local defense of New Orleans), 4 in North Carolina, 15 in South Carolina,
5 in Tennessee, 48 in Texas (mostly local guards), and 11 in Virginia. Companies
usually ranged from 40-120 men on paper. Whatever the statistics might have
been in the remaining Confederate states Lonn’s figures are surprising. Many
foreign-born volunteers provided useful service to the Confederacy. As the war
drew on, many such volunteers became reluctant to re-enrol after their terms
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ended. Many others who had not enrolled at all resisted Conscription on grounds
of alien exemption. Such unwillingness to defend the besieged South from longterm residents caused deep frustration, and looking at the population figures in
Table 1, it is easy to see why. Since immigrant populations tend to consist of a
higher percentage of working age males than in the native population,
conscription exaggerated the proportional significance of these foreign-born
populations. In Virginia for example, the census records 22,000 British-born
persons in a state population of 1,047,300 free whites. Even if the gender and age
ratios among these Britons were identical to the native born population the figures
still indicate 10,000 fighting age men who could claim exemption. This
represented a significant number to the desperate Confederacy.36
When Her Majesty’s Government in London gave notice of British neutrality
early in 1861, the Foreign Office instructed all personnel in America to act
according to The Crown’s stated position and maintain the neutrality of every
British person. This meant securing the exemption of every non-naturalized
Briton, and keeping Her Majesty’s subjects from volunteering. In Union States, it
was possible for the Foreign Office to intervene in behalf of Britons through Her
Majesty’s ambassador to Washington, Lord Lyons. Her Majesty’s consuls,
stationed in various major port cities along America’s waterways and coasts, made
appeals for Britons locally to American military and political officials. Within the
seceded states however, matters were more complicated. Writing to John Slidell
on October 8th, 1863 Judah Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State,
explained the status of foreign consuls in the Confederacy thus,
36
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When the Confederacy was first formed there were in our ports a number of
British Consuls… who had been recognized as such, not only by the government
of the United States, which was then the authorized agent of the several states for
that purpose, but by the state authorities themselves. Under the law of nations
these officials are not entitled to exercise political or diplomatic functions…37
The British consuls and vice-consuls in the new Confederacy were located at
Richmond, Norfolk and Fredericksburg in Virginia, Charleston and Wilmington in
the Carolinas, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans and Pensacola in the Deep South,
Key West Florida, and Galveston Texas. Their functions were to take inventories
of British vessels entering ports, to register goods, to hold the Captains register, to
see that proper duties were paid, to issue passports for ships and private persons to
leave, and to generally care for British persons and property in their
constituencies. As Benjamin pointed out, they were in no wise diplomatic
officials, having only commercial responsibilities. Since Britain intended to
remain neutral and would not recognize the Richmond government, but desired
some mediating voice for Her Majesty’s dispersed subjects, the Consuls within
Confederacy acted for much of the war beyond their strict legal limits, or as
private persons making bold personal appeals for British interests. In 1918,
Milladge A. Bonham published British Consuls in the Confederacy, a study of the
consuls’ struggle to carry out Foreign Office instructions in an ill-defined and
unprecedented diplomatic position. Bonham’s study charted the decent of the
consuls from their initial position as welcome and honored guests, to that of
troublesome, odorous and affronting agitators against Confederate Sovereignty. In
October 1863 the Davis administration took decision to expel the consuls, their
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continual protests against the drafting of British-born residents of the Confederacy
having become intolerable to the manpower-starved South.38
Concurrently, by 1863 Union authorities were consciously strengthening
provisions to respect the neutrality of resident Britons. These contrasting
developments in official attitudes reinforce many of the central lessons of the war.
Firstly, the loyal states were able to raise more troops with greater ease and had
less need of conscripting persons they had a debatable legal right to conscript.
Secondly, Seward’s Department of State, by threat and by reason, succeeded in
isolating the Confederate States and sinking their foreign policy. Therefore,
despite the bitter aftertaste in Northern popular memory, European 'neutrality'
emphatically favored the Union. Thirdly, the Confederacy became a truly military
society in the later years of the war. Borders were continually receding, and the
government was increasingly concerned with nothing beyond the war effort.
Isolated in the world, and with absolutely no mediating voices of protest coming
from outside the Confederacy, Confederate authorities looked to tap any and every
source of manpower, no matter how small and insignificant it might have seemed.
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Table 2: Persons of Foreign nativity as a percentage of electorates by state
Votes polledlast pre-war
gubernatorial
election

State

Total
Foreign

Total
population

Alabama
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusett
s
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin

12350
3740
146077
80556
9160
3280
11643
324573
118170
106070
12690
59792
80603
37731
77443

256081
324143
358110
451504
90589
77747
591550
1704291
1338710
673779
106390
919484
357456
626947
515918

270190
171477
259923
221851
45940
41128
301066
898941
693348
353900
106390
474193
189648
316527
256829

118589
73994
206942
77313
22429
19250
132499
439503
316804
164650
78621
217883
101499
131229
128371

President
ial votes
polled1860
90122
54152
119812
74819
16115
13301
106717
339631
272146
128739
NA*
146216
50510
100918
92502

259503
148609
58716
8556
160525

1221432
736142
169395
353899
1063489

592231
388036
91704
186273
563131

339059
200504
43186
85838
337125

169548
154758
34787
69095
165563

169534
121268
35499
44867
158138

20933
122701
997568
3290
328125
5117
430163
37322

325579
646699
3831590
629942
2302808
52160
2849259
170649

159563
322733
1921311
313670
1171698
31451
1427943
82294

88509
167479
883124
143443
562901
19736
702316
46417

65493
121215
675156
96712
442730
14758
476442
19951

71581
105029
672925
112622
355768
9347
492666
23018

9981
21218
43401
32718
35035
276901

291300
826722
420891
314693
1047299
773693

146160
422779
228585
158406
528842
406309

68154
189470
109625
88230
246006
198914

NA**
146106
62855
44644
166891
152179

Total
Males

Males
over 20

72534
61017
102443
88378
15312
13184
105614
164290
263503
109834
13249
143470
41041
245168
85822

NA
144110
63727
148656
113538
112538

* Kansas did not take part in the 1860 election.
** South Carolina had no popular poll for its Electoral College votes or its
gubernatorial races until after the war. Popular vote decided only the House, all
other elections being decided in the state legislature.
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By 1860, the United States was a maturing nation state coming of age in power
and reach in the world. However, its population was still growing and its
demographic trends were constantly subject to change as the tides of migration
shifted. The complex and controlled legal processes of immigration and
citizenship, which are at the center of population control for developed nation
states in our times, were not in place in mid nineteenth century America.
Consequently, it was possible to exist in an ambiguous position between alien and
native status. Many states were desperate for new blood. Iowa for example, shows
a foreign born population of 100,000 out of a total white population of 500,000 in
the 1860 census. It was certainly not necessary to take any oath of citizenship in
order to remain resident indefinitely, work and often even own land in the states.
In cities such as New York and Boston, there were very large populations of
foreign-born workers not on record at all.39
Although it was not legal for non-citizens to own land in American states, in
reality it was often possible to acquire titles without going through the actual
process of legal naturalization. Many of the Britons within the Confederate States
were commercial traders or maritime workers temporarily resident in port cities.
Many more were skilled laborers in these maritime cities, and many more came as
manual laborers, either migrating for seasonal work or working as farm hands
until they could gain their own property. For this reason there were large numbers
of poor laborers who had no intention of returning to Britain and had expressed

39
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intentions to naturalize, but had not by 1861 found it immediately necessary to do
so. Such persons lived in a status between British and American citizenship,
neither one nor the other fully, but in the de facto sense, partly both. When the war
began, the legal status of such persons became a major point of contention and a
flash point in the diplomatic struggle between consular personnel and the
Confederate States.
The election returns listed in table 2 demonstrate the significance of foreignborn persons who lived permanently in an ambiguous citizenship status. The
Presidential election of 1860 enjoyed the second highest turnout of American
electoral history, 82% nationally. Without examining electoral records county by
county it is difficult to know how many foreign-born persons voted without
having been naturalized. However, the differences from state to state are
interesting and make a number of important suggestions.
New York
North Carolina

997568

3831590

1921311

883124

675156

672925

3290

629942

313670

143443

96712

112622

In 1860, New York was a populous free state with a large immigrant
population. North Carolina was a slave state with a much smaller population and
little immigration. From these two examples, it is clear that in North and South
alike, it was possible for non-native persons to live almost indefinitely in an
ambiguous state of citizenship. We assume that the population of persons of
foreign nativity was, at least, equal to the native population in percentage of males
above 20 years of age. In that case, New York’s population of non-native born
men of voting age was around 225,000, and North Carolina’s, just 740. The
Eighth Census gives New York’s total number of males over 20 as 883,124, while
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the electoral returns for the presidential election that year showed 675,000 voters.
Almost 100% of the native-born population would have had to turn out to vote if
the every one of the 225,000 foreign-born males over 20 had been unable to vote.
This is most unlikely. Of course many foreign born men would have been
naturalized, but since naturalization entailed a trip to the court house when a
circuit judge was available, and was unnecessary for work and residency, many
simply never bothered. It therefore seems likely, even from such bare statistics,
that there were many non-naturalized foreign-born residents in New York voting
in 1860.
In North Carolina, a mere 740 men are less visible in general trends. Even
without these men, the number of men over 20 was 141,000 and votes polled in
the 1860 presidential election numbered only 96,000. This was easily below the
national turnout of 82%. However, in the gubernatorial election the electoral votes
polled numbered much higher, 112,622. Again, it is unreasonable to expect a
small number of foreign-born voters to be visible in such general statistics, but
states were frequently more lax with the franchise at state and local elections than
for US elections. In Tennessee, the difference between total male population
above 20 years old and votes polled in 1860 was about 40,000 while the foreign
born population of voting age males was around 10,000. In Virginia, there was a
difference of 80,000 and with 15,000 voting age males of non-native birth.
What is clear from these tables is that in all states in 1860 the foreign born
populations, of which the British usually constituted the majority, represented
large portions of the work force and the potential or actual electorate. They
represented large numbers of residents who produced and consumed, paid taxes,
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and benefited from state expenditure. Courts, land, military forces, state railroads
and other infrastructure, ports etc. were facilities which states or the federal
government maintained that necessarily benefited, directly or indirectly, foreign
and native born alike. On the other hand, the process for acquiring citizenship was
loosely defined and largely unnecessary to daily life. Therefore, it was easy for
individuals to exist without the locus of their final and absolute sovereign being
indisputably certain. More than one reasonable claim to loyalty could easily exist
over a single person.
These foreign born persons had major significance for the diplomacy of the
Civil War, but they also reveal much that is of significance about the domestic
issues of the war. Chapter 1 will establish the context within which Civil War
diplomacy has its greatest significance by examining the growth of constitutional
ideological struggles regarding sovereignty and centralization within the early
republic. Through analysis of opposition made to conscription by Governors
Joseph Brown of Georgia and Horatio Seymour of New York this thesis will
argue that latent within all federal machinery there is the tendency towards
centralization. This need of governments to assert the sovereignty of the center
over the resident citizenry caused increasing tension between British consular
officials and secessionist governments. Chapters 2 and 3 will go on to examine
that process. Firstly, Chapter 2 will place the presence of large foreign-born
populations within the context of transatlantic diplomacy and the recognition
issue. The conflict between Confederate desire to secure recognition, and the need
to enlist all available manpower meant that in the early years of the war
Confederate political leaders were keen to recognize and accept the neutrality of
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Britons. However, difficulties arose from the zealousness of enroling officers who
were conscious of the need to draft them. Chapter 3 will go on to show however
that many resident Britons had acquired de facto citizenship by their residency. As
British willingness to entertain the idea of recognition dwindled, Confederates lost
patience with their uncooperative foreign-born population, and their troublesome
consular protectors. This process, and the concurrent softening of Union attitudes,
provides a domestic, smaller scale dimension to the more commonly repeated
themes of the transatlantic history of the Civil War.
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Chapter one: The constitutional framework of an ‘irrepressible conflict’

In the twilight hours of July 3 1826 at Monticello, Virginia Thomas Jefferson
clung frailly to the last drops of his life, determined to see his fiftieth and final
Independence Day. As his last surviving daughter Martha Jefferson Randolph
nursed him through his final trial, the family of second President John Adams
watched as their own Patriot legend saw out his last hours, also clinging
tenaciously on for the Fourth. The story goes that Adams’ last words were
“Jefferson is yet alive” while Jefferson triumphantly whispered “Independence
forever!” Jefferson biographer James Parton wrote in 1874,
When it became known that the author of the Declaration and its most powerful
defender had both breathed their last on the Fourth of July, the fiftieth since they
had set it apart from the roll of common days, it seemed as if heaven had given its
visible and unerring sanction to the work they had done.40
Jefferson’s daughter Martha often sat by the old man, comforting him, talking
and reading, while many miles to the north the Virginian’s old friend lay talking
to his young grandson, Charles Francis Adams. Forty years later the Republic
these two Patriots had fought to establish would be guided through its direst crisis
partly by the skilled and invaluable diplomacy of C. F. Adams, by then a fullfledged statesman in the family tradition. The symmetry of the last hours of
Jefferson and Adams is so well scripted as to defy belief, and so often repeated as
to have lost its significance. However, Parton was wrong in supposing that the
significance of this passing was as a poetical echo of history alone. Though
Jefferson was dead, the unresolved conflicts of his republic had many more years
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left to live, and the following generations of the Adams dynasty would play
leading roles in deciding them. 41
In 1790, during the debate over assumption of a national debt the Virginia
Legislature issued Patrick Henry’s Virginia resolutions. Henry warned of the
creation of an executive authority, “pervading every branch of government”.
Repeating the Constitutional maxim that power not specifically granted to
congress resided in the states, Henry asserted that he could, “find no clause in the
Constitution authorizing Congress to assume the debts of the states”. Virginia
insisted that, “the rights of the states as contracting parties be considered as
sovereign”. These resolutions were the first overt, concerted attempt in the
decades between ratification and the Civil War to establish the states as the proper
and final arbiters of the constitutionality of congressional or executive acts. 42
In February 1971, Thomas Jefferson argued in a letter to President Washington
that the Federalist proposed national bank did not fall under the expressed
authority of Congress to lay taxes. Neither was it covered by the authority to
borrow money, “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
States”. Jefferson emphasized that Congress could only regulate commerce
between the states. Internal regulation of a state’s commerce, “remains exclusively
with its own legislature”. The Constitution established in Congress only the
powers ‘necessary’ to carry out its prerogatives, not the authority to do whatever
is ‘convenient’. “Nothing but a necessity invincible by any other means, can
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justify such a prostitution of the laws which constitute the pillars of our whole
legal system.” Jefferson clearly believed that not only did true sovereignty lie in
the states, but that any sovereignty allowed to Congress was regrettable and ought
to be carefully limited.43
Alexander Hamilton’s response one week later defended the bank with the
explicit commitments to national sovereignty he had been too cautious to make
during the ratification debates. He stated that it was an essential “general
principle” of government necessary, “to every step of progress to be made by the
United States”, that every authority placed in the national government was
sovereign. Furthermore the government had the, “right to employ all the means
requisite and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power, which
are not precluded by the restrictions and exemptions specified in the Constitution,
or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society”.44
Hamilton commented that in common use the word ‘necessary’ meant
‘requisite, incidental, useful to’ and ‘conducive’. He postulated the hypothesis that
the United States might acquire territory by force from a neighboring state. In
such a case would Congress govern this land by specifically enumerated laws, or
by ‘the nature of political society’? Hamilton’s arguments rested on the principle
of implicit authority and he came very close to stating that the Constitution
effectively granted Congress all powers not specifically withheld, rather than the
other way around.
In 1798, the Federalist controlled Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts
granting federal powers of coercion over individuals in order to silence spoken or
43
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written criticism from the pro-Jacobins factions, potentially including the
Jeffersonian republicans. In response, the Kentucky legislature issued resolutions
on November 16 stating, “that the several states composing the United States of
America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general
government”. One month later, the Virginia resolutions, while affirming a
continued commitment to the idea of the Union, protested that the Acts would,
“consolidate the states, by degrees, into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and
inevitable consequence of which would be, to transform the present republican
system... into an (absolute monarchy)”.45
Jefferson and Madison would not live to see the State Rights principle as a tool
of political opposition violently crushed forever. However, their VirginiaKentucky resolutions were effectively rendered useless only five years later, when
Marbury vs. Madison laid the juridical groundwork which made eventual federal
sovereignty every bit as inevitable as Virginia feared.
In Marbury vs. Madison 1803, Federalist Chief Justice Marshall threw out
William Marbury’s suit demanding that Madison validate the judicial appointment
which the outgoing Adams administration had issued to him, but which the
President had not had time to sign. Marshall asserted that the 1789 Judiciary Act
to which Marbury had appealed was unconstitutional, saying, “(Congress cannot)
give the court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared that it
shall be original”.46

44

Hofstadter, Great Issues, 2:165.
Ibid., 2:177; Ibid., 2:184.
46
Ibid., 2:193.
45

37

Marbury vs. Madison was beyond a mere refutation of the Virginia-Kentucky
claim that the states were the appropriate arbiters of constitutional matters. It was
a foundational philosophy for sovereign federal government which would
eventually dominate the national political economy. Marshall asked to what
purpose limits to power are committed to writing, “if at any time these limits may
be passed by those intended to be restrained?” This query might appear to be a
case for the limitations of constitutional government, but Marshall went on, “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the juridical department to say what the law
is”. Moreover, when it came to the nature of the law, Marshall was clear that as
the final law of appeal, the Constitution was the single irresistible force in
America, the sovereign law!47
Despite these early signs that Constitutional law contained an innate need for
final authority over individuals, the ideas of state sovereignty, nullification and
secession remained constant themes in American political discourse. Thus, in his
Fort Hill address on July 26 1831, John C Calhoun asserted that sovereignty
emanated from the people of the states as, “distinct political communities”
representing, “particular local interests”. He defended the necessity of divided
sovereignty and warned, “it is not possible to distinguish practically between a
government having all power, and one having the right to take which power it
pleases”. In response, President Jackson called nullification undemocratic because
it, “made state law paramount to the Constitution”. Jackson certainly did not
believe in unlimited appeal. Sovereignty must rest somewhere, and supreme law
must bind all lower legal authority to its protection. South Carolina was only a
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minority section contending against the national political community for the right
of sovereignty and Jackson was explicitly clear that the government, as sovereign,
rested its appeal on the obligations of its individual citizens. “On your individual
support of your government depends the great decision it involves; whether your
sacred union will be preserved and the blessing it secures for us as one people
shall be maintained”.48
Responding to Lincoln’s election, Georgia’s secessionist governor Joseph
Emerson Brown issued an address on November 7 1860, articulating his
philosophy on the disruption of the Union. Brown believed the Constitution to be
a contract in which the states were the contracting parties, and that Northern
denials of Southern rights had negated this contract. Brown attacked Northern
states for having passed state laws inhibiting the universal rights of the citizens of
other sovereign states; rights guaranteed by the compact between the states.49 The
sovereign states of the South had only signed the Constitution on the
understanding that it recognized slave property. Brown believed that democratic
governments were as much obliged to protect their citizens, as the citizenry was to
obey their government and that, “the duties and obligations of the state and citizen
are reciprocal”50 Robert Barnwell Rhett had previously expounded on his views as
to the extent of this relationship saying, “(state sovereignty) secures to each state
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the right to enter the territories with her citizens. The ingress of the citizen is the
ingress of his sovereign, who is bound to protect him in his settlement”.51
Brown shared Rhett’s views on state authority, believing that the Constitution
had no value outside of its usefulness to states in the pursuit of their prerogatives.
Although this outlook dated back to Jefferson’s republicans and had once been
entirely mainstream political faith, it seemed increasingly radical as the republic
matured. As the United States became more fluid, gaining the social and economic
cohesion of a developing nation state, this extreme form of State Rights ideology
was increasingly found only on the lips of fire-eaters. On the national political
landscape by 1860, Southern-rights advocates seemed parochial, partisan and
backward looking. Denying any measure of self-justified identity and purpose to
the Union, they believed that even through the operation of federal machinery, it
was the state level at which authority, and guarantees of individual rights lay.
Brown argued that the federal government had no authority to proscribe slave
owners from carrying their personal property, as guaranteed by their states, into
the territories, because the citizenry to which the sovereign states laid claim were
the embodiment of their prerogatives. Brown’s message, issued from
Milledgeville like a modern-day Caesar from his tiny Rome, eloquently
expounded the virtues of republican authority.
The state has the right to require from each of her citizens prompt obedience to
her laws, to command his services in the field of battle against her enemies,
whenever in her judgment it may be necessary for her protection, or the
vindication of her honor; and to tax him to any extent her necessities may at any
time require.52
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In return the Georgian was, “entitled to demand and receive full and ample
protection of his life, his liberty, his family his reputation, and his property of
every description”. Through his entire message, which served both to defy the
Northern majority and galvanize the jealousy of Georgians for their rights, Brown
set the tone both for the coming war between the sections, and his own personal
battles with Richmond and the British Consul at Savannah. Brown astutely stated,
“A sovereign state should either protect her citizens or cease to claim their
allegiance, and their obedience to her laws”. He hereby made explicit that which
is so often left implicit in government during times of peace. The very existence
and justification of a nation state, the vindication of its life and the substance of its
claims outside its own borders, are all contingent upon that state’s authority over,
and absolutist claims upon, the individual citizen.53
The themes of Brown’s romantic yet aggressive speech found much resonance
when the Georgia secession convention gathered on January 16 1861 to reassert
the independence of the sovereign state of Georgia. On January 22 the convention
issued an ordinance stating, “The people of Georgia in convention assembled, do
hereby ordain that all white persons residing within the limits of this state at the
date of the ordinance of secession, are hereby constituted citizens of the state
without regard to place of birth or length of residence”.54 Three days later the
convention clarified the wider significance of this ordinance. Foreign persons
residing permanently in the state but not wishing to be citizens were required to
attain papers confirming their nativity with a view to repatriation. Persons born in
Georgia, or of a Georgian father, were to be Georgia citizens. US citizens settling
53
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in Georgia within a year of secession would be considered Georgian. Thereafter,
naturalization procedures would be in place. Persons becoming citizens would be
required to pledge an oath of allegiance and renounce previous loyalties by
saying, “I do swear that I renounce and forever abjure any allegiance and fidelity
to every Prince, Potentate, or Sovereignty whatever, except the State of
Georgia.”55
These ordinances demonstrated an acute awareness among the convention
delegates that independent government rested fundamentally on loyalty and
concurrent hegemony. Regarding the relationship between citizenship and militia
service the convention dictated that non-citizens would not be permitted to serve,
while every eligible male would be obligated to serve. Thus the convention
revealed its awareness that without a studiously guarded connection between
government protection and citizens’ obligations, Georgia’s bid for independence
would fail. With this reciprocal relationship in mind, the convention followed in
American legal and tradition by adding a Bill of Rights to the new state
constitution. The bill enshrined essential rights such as government by consent,
property protection and due process, the right of petition, the right to bear arms,
and the right to legal counsel. In re-placing these federal guarantees at state level,
Georgia claimed extensive powers as the sole protectors of its citizens, and
demanded obedience in return.56
A special session of the constitutional convention meeting at Savannah on
March 7 proclaimed that US government office holders not resigning within ten
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days would be declared alien, never to be Georgia citizens again. Furthermore,
any office holders remaining loyal to the US in ‘hostile demonstration’ would
have their property confiscated. Clearly no state seriously claiming independence
can give acquiescence to a foreign government holding final authority over its
own citizens, or inside its territory. Although secessionists claimed that the states
had always been sovereign and were simply taking up their rights again, these
ordinances radically shifted authority. Individual states had never previously cared
who moved in from other states, or held office under the auspices of the United
States within Georgia’s borders.57
Joseph Brown’s career as war governor demonstrated the impossibility of
maintaining final state sovereignty within a federal system. According to William
Harris Bragg,
A showdown over the issue of troops for Georgia’s defense became unavoidable
even before the firing on Sumter. In February 1861, while Georgia was still an
independent republic, the Provincial Congress had given President Davis “control
of military operations” in the Confederate States, control which the state secession
convention ratified.58
Throughout the war Brown attempted to operate within the Confederate
framework as though Georgia retained the sovereign right of choice in each
matter, and as though every authority the Confederacy exercised was merely
borrowed. In December 1861 a bill was organized in the state legislature to relieve
Georgia of the cost of coastal defense by transferring state troops at Savannah into
Confederate service. Brown, who was determined not to see the domination of
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Washington, rejected in secession, replaced by a new imperial authority of
Southern making, resisted the bill.
Do we get rid of the expense by the proposed transfer? I maintain that it does
not… save the state one dollar. If the troops are transferred then the Confederacy
will pay the expenses and Georgia, as a member of the Confederacy, will have to
meet her part of it.59
Brown made very clear in speeches and writing through the early years of the
war, exactly what kind of revolution he believed secession to be. He began his
special message to the Georgia legislature November 6 1861 with a brief history
of the early American Republic. He referred to the ‘diversity of opinion’ at the
Philadelphia Convention, calling those debates the beginnings of the FederalistRepublican conflict. Brown believed that the Jeffersonian view had triumphed in
the Constitution, a document which went to lengths to only grant specified
powers, thus enshrining state sovereignty. But no sooner was the Constitution
ratified than did Jefferson’s opponents begin undoing its work.
The statesmen of the original federalist schools have, however, with the assistance
of the tariff laws, navigation acts, fishery laws and other legislation intended to
build up and foster Northern interests… succeeded in directing the Northern mind
into the consolidation channel. By the instrumentality of these laws the
government of the United States has poured the wealth of the South… into the lap
of the North.60
Brown called the doctrine of State Rights, “(the) only security against
encroachment of haughty and unrestrained imperial power”. Secession, according
to Brown, was unquestionably a reaction to the national dominance of an opposed
and malignant political economy which was directly abusing southern rights and
wealth. But neither in these early months of defiance, nor in the death throws of
the Confederacy did Brown ever subscribe to a philosophy of independence and
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any cost. He continued his special message by turning from the early Republic, to
the nature of the new Southern Republic, highlighting the sixteenth item of the
eighteenth section of the Confederate Constitution which authorized the
Confederacy to discipline and equip the state militia, but not to raise troops or
appoint their officers. He lambasted the Military Provisions Act of May 8 1861,
which gave elective power over state officers to the President, saying,
I am not aware of any case in which the government of the United States prior to
its disruption, ever claimed or exercised the power to accept volunteer troops,
commission their offices, and order them into service, without consulting the
executive officer of the state from which they were received.61
The underlying argument of Brown’s opposition to Confederate
aggrandizement was a belief that all federal machinery must grow into nation
states unless sovereignty is actively and jealously reserved elsewhere. While he
professed faith in Davis’ character, Brown warned of ‘some future Napoleon’ less
virtuous and wise. Yet, Brown frequently appeared to have little active faith in
Davis’ virtue or wisdom. Brown has always been named in the historical record as
chief among the ‘obstructionists’. He often attempted to prevent Confederate
details from returning impressed goods from Georgia to their government. With
each revision to the Conscription Act he reorganized the militia accordingly to
exempt the maximum number of men and keep the largest state force for local
defense. He encouraged the Georgia legislature to attempt obstruction or
nullification of conscription and Confederate authority to declare martial law and
suspend habeas corpus. He raised a storm when General Bragg took control of the
state railroad in 1864. Finally, in the last years of war he spoke out for peace
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agitating for an offer of ‘peace on the principles of 1776’. Georgia historian T.
Conn Bryan wrote that, “when the second (Conscription Act) passed on
September 27 1862… Brown became defiant. He refused to allow the new Act to
be enforced in Georgia until the legislature had deliberated upon it”.62
It is arguable however, that Brown’s historical reputation as an obstreperous
and difficult governor is largely due to misunderstandings concerning the complex
Civil War processes of getting troops into the field. Brown never failed to answer
calls made to Georgia for volunteer troops, as long as they entered national service
as Georgia troops. In the summer of 1861, when Confederate authorities requested
Georgia to raise a further state army than the one Brown had already voluntarily
submitted, he sent the 2500 men of the 4th State Brigade under General William
Phillips. Jefferson Davis however, insisted that under the Confederate law passed
that May, he could accept no troop units larger than a regiment, and ordered the
brigade to be broken up and submitted to national service piecemeal. This allowed
the President to appoint new commanding officers, and he demoted Phillips to a
mere Colonel. The following spring, Brown’s friend and ally Henry Roots
Jackson suffered the same fate. After a standoff between Davis and Brown, who
insisted that Jackson receive a General’s commission, Roots Jackson resigned his
Confederate commission to become a Brigadier-General in the state forces.63
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Brown was in his fifth term as Georgia’s governor when Georgia was finally
defeated. The constant support from Georgia’s troops played a large role in his
electoral dominance. On December 3 1861, the Georgia volunteers, which the
legislature proposed to transfer to Confederate service, issued a set of resolutions
in defiance of their state officials. They remonstrated, “We are not the property of
the general assembly of Georgia to be sold and transferred… like a promissory
note”. This statement highlighted a conviction among Georgia volunteers that
citizenship was a contractual matter of mutuality.64
Brown consistently lauded the spirit of volunteerism, and always claimed to
share it. In a message to the legislature January 1 1862, he argued that accepting
volunteers under state authority for stated terms of service created ‘an implied
contract’, which would be broken if Georgia, “(transferred) them to another
government without their consent…. It would be as much a breach of contract and
a violation of good faith on the part of the state as it would be a breach on the part
of one of the troops to desert”. This statement appears to reveal a belief that the
nature of volunteer-soldiers’ citizenship was entirely contractual. However, the
emphasis Brown placed on state sovereignty in his dealings with Confederate
authorities shows that even this most ardent of State Rights advocates did not
reject the principle of absolute governmental sovereignty over the individual. He
merely held a different view on its locus. In fact, Georgia’s leaders took state
authority and responsibility very seriously, seeing Georgian’s welfare in the war
as entirely a state responsibility. Brown made sure that Georgia cared for and
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defended, as far as possible, the rights of its troops. Further, Georgia also provided
food relief, supply of state sponsored cheap salt, and tax exemptions for poor
soldiers and their families. By 1864, fully 51% of state expenditure went on
welfare, as against 43% on military spending. “Brown and the legislature raised
the budget and enlarged expenditure tremendously, spending in 1863 an amount in
excess of all the state appropriations for the 1850s”.65
In bitter defeat after the Old South was dead, the ‘Lost Cause’ became the civil
religion of the New South, the glass through which all history was remembered
and by which all reputations were warped. Davis, who had been widely
disrespected and had proved an inept judge of men, became a noble, tragic hero.
Brown, a leader loved in his own state, and possibly the truest defender of the
philosophy that inspired secession, has been remembered as troublesome and
traitorous. In hindsight, it is clear that only in the shared experience of war, defeat
and retrospect did the South enjoy any marked level of ‘national consciousness’.
Frank Owsley, a priest of the Lost Cause, wrote State Rights in the
Confederacy in 1925. He lamented the localism and parochial short-sightedness of
Civil War military strategy, and blamed governors of Brown’s ilk for sabotaging
the Confederacy and crippling the South before the Northern war machine.
Writing from a generation of bitterness with a view perverted by defeat Owsley
famously eulogized over the Confederacy that it had “died of State Rights”. W. J.
Cash in 1941 referred to the South as, “not quite a nation within a nation- but the
next thing to it”. Much later, Emory Thomas wrote that Southern nationalism was
ironically incomplete and un-cohesive until the shared experience of defeat
64

Candler, Records, 2:169.

48

created a collective memory in the postbellum era. Regarding the necessity of
wartime centralization Drew Faust stated, “For all its initially reactionary designs,
for its dedication to preserving the rights associated with its peculiar species of
property, the Southern elite was from the outset of the war pushed into mediating
every aspect of its rule”. During and after the war, many Southerners seemed to
forget the anti-federal philosophy of secession, desiring independence at any
cost.66
Joseph Brown never lost sight of the South’s reactionary designs, and he was
no traitor to the cause. He followed the logic of localism and secession to its end
and insisted, as far as possible, that the South fight for independence in the spirit
of the citizen-soldier and ‘the several states’. By mid-1863 the Conscription Act
had been in operation over a year and Brown had been forced to acquiesce, though
he never missed an opportunity to dispute it with Confederate officials. By the
time Union armies were pressing in at Georgia’s borders, Brown’s prerogatives as
‘commander in chief’ of Georgia had been reduced to organizing volunteer units
for local defense against Yankee raids. Nevertheless, Brown did not miss good
opportunities to preach the lost gospel of volunteerism. On June 22 he issued an
appeal to the people of Georgia for 8,000 six-month volunteers for Confederate
service in local defense. He stressed categorically that authority to muster,
organize, appoint officers, and direct the service of these units lay with him alone.
Brown called for ‘promptness and devotion to the state’, and urged militia officers
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to be ready to show mustering men their own names on the volunteer rolls.
Brown’s romantic, republican rhetoric was a stark contrast to the anger and
cynicism with which he routinely addressed Confederate authorities,
Will Georgians refuse to volunteer for this defence? (sic) The man able to bear
arms who will wait for a draft before he will join an organization to repel the
enemy, whose brutal soldiery comes to his home to destroy his property and
insult… his wife and daughters, is unworthy of the proud name of Georgian and
should fear lest he be marked as disloyal… to the government that throws its
protection over him.67
Volunteerism was therefore the necessary response of the free citizen, but it
was also a matter of obligation, a response to protection. In a further call for
volunteers following the fall of Vicksburg Brown threatened, “We are determined
to be a free people, cost what it may, and we should permit no man to remain
among us and enjoy the protection of the Government who refuses to do his part
to secure our independence”. Here Brown revealed the contradiction in his
opposition to Richmond, the same contradiction undermining the Confederate
reaction to Washington. The nobility of volunteerism was an attractive carrot, but
it was not without its stick. Brown promised he would fill his quota and “that such
requisition (will) be responded to, if need be, by draft”. It seems that no matter
whether citizenship centered on Washington, Richmond or Milledgeville, a citizen
could only ever be ‘free’ to choose for his government. Choosing against any
government that claimed him, or choosing to claim no government was not an
available option.68
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Brown determined from the beginning of Georgia’s secessionist experiment
that the state would be the sovereign to which each individual within Georgia’s
borders would answer. Certain that secession was imminent, Brown encouraged
the legislature on December 6 1860 to prepare for independence with ‘speedy and
direct’ communication with Europe aimed at securing Southern merchant vessels.
The South needed to take control of its own shipping and mails and to achieve this
Brown proposed a steam liner company, guaranteed by the state, paying 5%
annually on capital investment. More than merely commerce and mail, Southern
liners would secure, “a large portion of the immigrant travel of continental
Europe”. Brown thereby proposed a direct state investment of wealth for a return
of individuals. On numerous occasions Lincoln asserted his conviction that,
“Labor is superior to capital and deserves much higher consideration”. Brown
demonstrated an equal conviction that a state’s wealth rests upon citizens.69
On January 2 1861, Brown ordered state troops to take Fort Pulaski at
Savannah from federal control before Georgia had officially seceded. Brown
justified this highly unconstitutional act by saying, “I did not doubt that the state
would secede, and I therefore considered the question one of greatest
importance”.70 Questions of constitutionality and even consent were evidently
secondary considerations to the imperative needs of sovereign Georgia, and in the
following year Brown continued to wield the authority of this sovereignty over
Georgians in the state’s defense. On April 22 1861, he issued an order prohibiting
state citizens from paying any debts held in enemy states. Rather, they were to
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transfer debt payments to the state of Georgia, which would hold the money at
interest for state funding until after peaceful separation. This would, “enable
(citizens) to perform a patriotic duty and to assist the state, and through her the
Confederate States…”71
The qualification, ‘through her’ accurately summated the Joe Brown
philosophy of the secessionist struggle. Though few men were more fervent in
their desire for independence, Brown would never cede the point that any
government above Georgia had the right to take from the state what had not been
voluntarily submitted. However, he was always very willing to provide men and
arms for the struggle at sovereign Georgia’s cost. In all his correspondence with
Richmond protesting Conscription, he continually reminded the Davis
administration that Georgia had never failed to fill a requisition for troops made of
it. On April 22 1861, Brown ordered Captain Hardman’s Macon ‘Floyd Rifles’,
Captain Smith’s ‘Macon volunteers’, Captain Doyal’s Griffin ‘Spalding Gray’s’,
and Captain Colquitt’s Columbus ‘City Light Guards’ into Confederate service at
Norfolk, Virginia. However, only two months later, on June 13, he disciplined
Captain Lamar of the Newton County volunteers for leaving Georgia with 80 state
rifles without having executive department instructions to do so. 72
In February 1863, after months of refusing to relinquish his militia officers to
Confederate Conscription, Brown surprisingly ordered all of his officers into
service with Beauregard to defend the threatened coast. Although the emergency
quickly passed and the officers were called home, Brown demonstrated continuing
willingness to contribute. Where necessary he would even do so through
71
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Confederate machinery, as long as Georgia retained the final word of authority
over state troops. It was the insistence that Confederate prerogatives only be
pursued with explicit acknowledgement of authority granted from the states in
every instance which made conflict between Brown and Richmond inevitable. 73
Constitutional objections to federal governments usurping the prerogatives of
the States in the persons of their citizens in order to fight the war were not limited
to the Confederate States. It was not only reactionary Southerners in their desire to
completely reject the federal center in Washington who struggled with the
question of where the locus of sovereignty over the individual in America truly
lay. On Saturday July 11 1863, Union Provost Marshall General Jams Fry drew
names for the draft in New York City. When the Sunday papers published the
lists, the city, whose population was already alienated by emancipation and the
$300 exemption clause, exploded. In five days of unrest, anti-black mobs of poor
white workers attacked the Provost Marshall’s office and centers of New York’s
black community such as the Negro Children’s Orphanage. During the riots, the
conservative Democrat Governor, Horatio Seymour made numerous speeches in
the city appealing for calm. He was crucified in the Republican partisan press,
such as Horace Greeley’s Tribune, for addressing his audiences, supposedly
rioters, as “my friends”, and was blamed for exciting a spirit of rebellion. Like
Brown in Georgia, Seymour is remembered by history as an obstructionist. He
was wrongly called a Copperhead and the steadfastness with which he met New
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York’s quotas of troops was overlooked in the excitement of his opposition to
Lincoln.74
In his annual message to the state legislature on January 6 Seymour, like
Brown, had espoused a philosophy of liberty, State Rights and strict
constitutionalist Union. He stated, “Slavery has been the subject of the conflict,
not the cause…. The cause was a pervading disregard of obligations of laws and
constitutions”. Seymour referred as much to Radical Republicans as to Rebels in
this statement. Unsurprisingly for the son of a New York banker, he had initially
advocated peaceful settlement. However, after Fort Sumter Seymour proved
himself an active and committed loyalist who rejected secession as a right.
Nevertheless, he also rejected extensive federal rights and authority. He believed
that governments are, “entitled to deference (only when) acting within the limits
of their jurisdictions, and representing the interests, honor and dignity of the
people”. He referred to usurpation, whether by the executive of judicial
prerogatives, states of national policy decisions, or federal government of state
rights, as ‘revolution’. Seymour condemned Lincoln’s policy for suspending
habeas corpus and carrying citizens beyond their home states to try them in
military courts when the states already had perfectly adequate court systems in
place. He labeled such excesses, “a body of tyranny which cannot be enlarged”
and lamented the surrender of the rights of liberty for the expediency of war.
Seymour denied categorically, “that this rebellion can suspend a single right of the
citizens of loyal states”. He reminded the state of New York that while a three
quarter vote of the states could add to or remove authority from the body they had
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created, “the General Government can in no way touch one right of the states and
in no way invade their jurisdiction”. Seymour firmly believed that governments
took their strength from their integrity and faithfulness to legal limits.
“Government is not strengthened by the exercise of questionable laws, but by wise
and energetic exercise of those that are incontestable”.75
The New York Times editorial on the address largely accepted Seymour’s
concerns but believed that faced with such imminent “impending peril” he should
be, “(willing) to make temporary sacrifices required to overt it”. However,
Seymour and Brown were both acutely aware that the federal aggrandizement
inevitably produced by great wars rarely proves temporary.
On July 4 1863, Seymour used the language of liberty on the national
anniversary to accuse the Lincoln administration of being, “hostile to our rights”.
He warned, “My Republican friends, there is a way by which the life of this nation
can be saved… we only say to you who hold almost all political power, to
exercise it according to our chartered rights”. Seymour appealed for a suspension
of the draft in New York and requested a Supreme Court ruling. He made his
distaste for conscription known and a week later, with the city’s troops sent to
Gettysburg, the riots exploded. Seymour urged upon peace and order from the
civic mobs but was not at odds with their sentiment. He wrote to Lincoln in early
August complaining that the draft quotas fell disproportionately against the favor
of Democratic wards. Seymour requested an adjustment of quotas, a suspension of
the draft in advance of a Supreme Court ruling, and a return to constitutional
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liberty. New York’s 300,000 military casualties, and thousands of war industry
laborers, had, according to Seymour, “cheerfully made these sacrifices because
they saw in the power of laws not only obligations to obedience, but also the
protection of their rights, persons and homes”. Without supplying guarantees to
liberty, Seymour believed no government could demand the kind of sacrifice that
loyal states were making. To compel such sacrifice was to nullify such guarantees
and this loss of constitutional government was a disaster. Such disasters Seymour
believed were, “produced as well by bringing laws into contempt, and by the
destruction of respect for the decision of the courts, as by open resistance”. ‘Open
resistance’ of course referred to the rebellion, which Seymour held in equal
contempt with Radical centralizers. Seymour and Brown were both Isaiah-like
figures, prophesying against their governments that they were doing the enemy’s
work for him in the name of liberty. Like true prophets, both were ignored.76
On August 7 Lincoln replied that he would order the quotas reviewed and
redrawn fairly if found to be unequal, but he would not suspend the draft. “While I
should be willing to facilitate the obtaining (of a Supreme Court ruling), I cannot
consent to lose time while it is being obtained. We are contending with an enemy
who drives every able bodied man he can reach into ranks…”77
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Lincoln never did facilitate a ruling on conscription in the Union’s highest
court. The Confederacy did not even have a Supreme Court. It was not until 1918
that conscription came before the Supreme Court and in that case Chief Justice
White quoted the Fourteenth amendment as making citizenship of the United
States “paramount and dominant”. Stewart Mitchell wrote, “(this amendment), it
will be remembered, was added after the Civil War”! Replying to Lincoln on
August 8, Seymour commentated that driving every able-bodied man into ranks
would be preferable to the unequal, partisan draft unfairly initiated in New York.78
William Hesseltine argued in Lincoln and the War Governors that ‘the War
Between the States’ is not a Constitutionally correct alternative title for the Civil
War. It was rather, “a war between the Federal Government and the authority of
all the states, North and South”. Brown and Seymour both saw that federal
authority was innately prone to growth and would inevitably usurp state
sovereignty without diligent care being taken to avoid such. In this, their views of
State Rights were almost identical and Lincoln’s struggles against Copperheads
and Conservatives demonstrate clearly the centrality of Federal maturation in the
Civil War era. It is a result of the triumph of federal sovereignty that these
governors both suffered abuse in their terms, and were consigned to history as
troublemakers. On October 8 1863, the New York Times editorialized against
Seymour and his outspoken line. The paper hoped that the state’s electorate would
return Lincoln in 1864 charging that, “while other states have only heard the hiss
of Copperheadism, we in New York have felt its sting”. Referring to the draft riots
the editorial continued, “Having known what it is to be without law, we should
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strike a blow for law. The spirit of faction that has effected New York is
effectively the same as that which seeks to rend the Union”.79
From the outset of preparation for war Governor Brown was determined to not
allow Georgia troops to be mustered into Confederate service in any manner
detrimental to state sovereignty. On March 1 1861 Secretary of War Leroy Pope
Walker requested that Brown turn over state troops to the provisional Confederate
army at Savannah and Pensacola, quoting the recent Act of Congress passed on
February 28 for provision of national forces. Section three of the Act authorized
the President to receive, “such forces as may now be in the service of said states”.
Section four stipulated that while troops could be accepted as organized by the
states, general officers would be appointed by the President. These two provisions
thus created a limit to the size of organization the Confederacy could accept
directly from state authority. When Brown replied on March 12 requesting
clarification as to how the troops would be received his language resonated with
the ideal of the citizen soldier, an ideal he believed was to be defended by state
authority. “I cannot, in justice to privates who have enlisted, tender the regiments
unless they are received with the officers which I have appointed, as the recruits
have nearly all been obtained by the officers appointed from civil life, with the
understanding that they are to go under them”.80
Here Brown defended the old republican notion of the local militia as a vital
political community organization for both peacetime and war. The Civil War, as
the first large-scale modern war in American history, allowed the federal
government to finally establish a monopoly on violence. Neither the Union nor the
79
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Confederate government could wage large-scale warfare while leaving community
defense in local hands. Thus, when Brown insisted that the February 28 Military
Organization Act was illegal based on the Constitutional reservation of the states’
right to elect officers for their troops, even in national service, he was subtly
resisted. Brown requested that Walker accept Georgia militia officers representing
regiments which could be quickly mustered, but were not actually in existence in
the field. Responding on May 15 Walker assured Brown that any troops in
existence would be received in whatever form Georgia held them, but that,
“(receiving) officers without men would not be… within the scope of the law”.
Troops mustered after the Confederate requisitions upon the states were made
would enter Confederate service as Confederate troops. Brown could not reserve
the right to appoint every single officer over every single Georgian in the field in
whatever organization.81
This correspondence revealed a subtle but radical difference in state and
Confederate understandings of sovereignty in the earliest stages of the war. Brown
would have preferred for Georgia to have the final right of instruction over every
Georgian troop, whether in local or national service. Confederate authorities
however believed that troops surrendered to Confederate service were under direct
Confederate authority, and that even a governor’s right to direct internal state
defense depended upon Confederate sanction. Section one of the contested Act
began, “that to enable the Government of the Confederate States of America to
maintain its jurisdiction over all questions of peace and war… the President be
authorized and directed to assume control of all military operations in every
80
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state…”. Thus the very first Confederate Act for defense demonstrated that
‘irrepressible conflict’ over citizens and sovereignty was as deeply rooted in the
fabric of the revolution against the Union as it had been within the Union itself.
Confederate tendentiousness towards centralization did not develop gradually out
of the imperative needs of war, but was innate.82
The issues of conscription and officer commissions were directly linked by the
question of whether the Confederacy had the authority to access Georgia’s
citizens through any channel other than the state of Georgia itself. Even Brown
admitted that if individual Georgians volunteered directly for Confederate service
then it was Richmond’s right to organize and direct them. Up to the Conscription
Act of April 16 1862, most Confederate troops were raised through the states, but
once in ‘common service’ they were accessible to Confederate authority. On
January 1 1862, Congress passed an Act for provision for the Confederate Army
which also allowed for the direct re-enlistment into Confederate service of state
armies, and volunteer units whose six month terms of service had finished. Brown
wrote to Judah Benjamin, then serving as Secretary of War, asking if the
Confederacy would,
…draw any distinction in reference to authority to commission between those
troops who entered the Confederate service through state authority, bearing
commissions from the executives of their respective states, and those who entered
independent of state authority.83
Brown also asked Benjamin what he took the Constitutional reservation of the
states’ right of commission to mean. Benjamin replied February 16, “Whether the
81
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troops originally entered the Confederate service through state authority, or
independent of it, they now re-enlist under the provisions of a law of Congress”.
He argued that the Constitution referred only to the militia and not to troops
organized by the Confederacy itself. While Benjamin assured Brown that he
preferred to take in this case troops as organized and officered by the state,
Georgia had no absolute right to insist upon such. This legislation therefore
signaled the direct transfer of significant numbers of Georgians from state to
Confederate sovereign authority.84
Two months later Brown’s worst fears were confirmed when the first
Conscription Act was passed and the new Secretary of War, George Randolph,
immediately began using its provisions to transfer all troops in national service
directly into the Confederate Army. All twelve-month volunteers of conscription
age were to be forcibly re-enlisted upon the completion of their original term.
Furthermore, although Randolph guaranteed their right to elect their own officers,
the president was to grant the commissions for those officers and not their
governors. Brown felt as though the revolution the South had so optimistically
entered into was slipping away, and the guilt for its failure lay with men claiming
to fight for it. He later protested to Secretary of War James A. Seddon in 1864
that, “Our people have become accustomed to Imperial utterances from
Washington, but such expressions are so utterly at variance with the principles on
which we entered into this contest in 1861”.85
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Brown, who had been in the process of re-enlisting such men to state service,
responded that he would cease his operations, hand the troops over to Confederate
authority and co-operate. This initial spirit of accommodation was based on the
hope of convincing Davis to allow sovereign Georgia to retain the right of
commission. It soon became clear however that Confederate authorities had no
such intentions. From that point onward, Brown refused his co-operation to
conscripting officers and openly condemned Confederate aggrandizement at every
opportunity. He directly raised no further troops, except for state defense. Brown
considered the Confederacy to be Georgia’s agent, not Georgia’s sovereign. Since
Confederate authorities had made clear that they did not consider state acceptance
and support to be necessary in every act of government, Brown refused to allow
usurping centralizers to use the state apparatus of sovereign Georgia to access
Georgia’s citizenry. Brown insisted on exemption from conscription for his militia
officers, viewing them as essential for the life of the state. He also took every
chance to withdraw troops, which he considered Georgia’s servants, from
Confederate authority. On September 10 1864, he ordered all furloughing militia
back into service, instructing officers to bring any men presently at home on
Confederate exemption. This action provoked hot protests from James Seddon,
which Brown ignored.86
On April 22 1862, Brown wrote to Davis the first of many letters attacking
Conscription. He believed the Act to be absolutely unnecessary since the states
themselves were capable of providing the Confederacy, their agent, with more
than enough troops for war. According to Brown if, “permission were given to
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(state) officers to fill up their ranks by recruits there would be no doubt of their
ability to do so, and I think they have the just right to expect this privilege”.
Brown felt that usurpations were an injustice to Georgia’s individual citizens and
through them, the state itself. By empowering the President to call Georgia’s
white males aged eighteen to thirty five into the field the Act, “(placed) it in his
power to destroy (Georgia’s) state government by disbanding her law-making
power”.87
Because Georgia permitted any white male over twenty-one to sit in the
legislature, the Confederacy had the power to conscript many members of the
state government, causing Georgia great loss. Similarly, railway workers on the
vital state road, engineers and workers in state war industries, and students in the
state University, were alike at Confederate mercy. Davis could conscript any
Major General from state forces and, “treat him like a deserter if he refuses to
obey the call and submit to the command of the subaltern placed over him”.
Whether or not Davis chose to act on these powers was irrelevant, for conscription
gave the Confederacy effective sovereignty. Richmond had the right at its own
time and choosing to take the best of Georgia’s citizens. Every time the
Confederacy expanded the range of conscription the Georgia legislature, always
over Brown’s protestations, turned the militia over to national service. In February
1864 Conscription age was lowered to seventeen and raised to fifty. Brown lost a
large portion of his militia for the fourth time and again had to reorganize: “Brown
succeeded in organizing another militia, composed largely of old men and boys,
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by June 1864”.88 The implication of this state of affairs was that Georgia existed
as a state only by the continued good will and provision of the Confederacy, rather
than vice versa.89
Having failed to persuade the Secretary of War of his understanding of State
Rights in Confederate military organization, Brown took his case directly to
President Davis. He again attacked the Conscription Act as unconstitutional and
suggested that Davis had been unwise to sign it and act upon its powers. In a
private letter dated May 8 1862, Brown reiterated his conviction that conscription
was unjustifiable on ‘the higher law of necessity’ since the states remained ready
to furnish the nation with men. Further still, conscription was an extraconstitutional usurpation. Section VIII of Article I stated in paragraph XII,
“Congress shall have power to raise and support armies”, then paragraph XV gave
Congress the power to call up the militia to repel invasion, while XVI reserved the
right of officering them to the states. Brown argued that if paragraph XII gave to
Congress any power it might deem necessary, the reservations stipulated later
were a thoughtless waste of ink.90
According to Brown, the framers of the Constitution had intended the
Confederacy to have power to raise armies only through calling up the militia. He
traced this condition back to the original Philadelphia convention, the work of
which the Confederacy had largely retained. Madison had proposed an article
88
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allowing Congress the power to elect the Generals of the militia, but no officers
below, and even this suggestion was considered too fearsome a grant of federal
power. The proposal was defeated, while the reservation of the states’ right to
appoint all officers was unanimously accepted. Brown quoted Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut’s caution, “That the whole authority over the militia ought by no
means to be taken away from the states, whose consequence would pine away to
nothing after such a sacrifice”.91
Compared to Madison’s proposal, the Conscription Act was a virtual
revolution. All the Georgia twelve-month men then in the field were, according to
it, subject to forcible re-enlistment and presidential appointment for vacancies
arising in the ranks of their officers. Brown was jealous to protect not merely the
right of Georgian’s to elect their officers, “but the Government which has, under
the Constitution, the right to issue the commission”. Knowing that Georgia’s
sovereignty depended categorically on its position as final judge and arbiter in any
case regarding its citizens, Brown informed Davis that he could, “consent to do no
act which commits Georgia to willing acquiescence in (conscription’s) binding
force upon her people”. 92
President Davis’ response on May 28 was chilling and ominous. Moreover, it
proved again the ultimate futility of such attempts to divide final sovereignty as
had caused the war in the first place. Firstly, Davis defended the Act on grounds
that the Attorney General and Congress of the Confederacy believed it to be
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constitutional. Like the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures over sixty years before,
Brown learned that federal governments could not accept arbitration on the
legality of their acts from lower tiers of government. Davis reminded Brown that
the section of the Constitution he so often quoted gave Congress war powers over
any revenue necessary for common defense, declaration of war, raising and
supporting armies and a navy, as well as, “rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval forces”. Not only had the states given Congress control of,
“the whole war power of each state”, but “they went further and actually
covenanted themselves not to ‘engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent danger as will not admit of delay’”.93
Davis argued that the Act was necessary, because the Confederacy could
hardly be expected to allow state-raised twelve-month men to return home in the
face of the enemy while the states mustered re-enforcements. The mere possibility
of this occurring demonstrates the absolute importance to the life of the
Confederacy of establishing control over the individual persons in its service.
Thus, Davis could not accept that Confederate armies were in every case
comprised of militia. In response to Brown’s assertion that the Constitution only
permitted the Confederacy to carry out war using state militia, Davis pointed out
that according to the Constitution, all arms bearing citizens were liable to serve as
militia, but that no state could keep troops in time of peace. Therefore, the militia
could only exist in actuality when called forth by law and that in peacetime, “the
men of a state… are no more militia than they are seamen”.94
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Davis believed that the war making powers of Congress were exclusive and
intended for more than defense in times of peril, whereas the right to call militia
was not exclusive but divided. Congress had power to call militia to national
service, whereas the states retained the right to call them out for local defense. In
cases where Congress asked the states to organize local units, such as six-month
home guards, these Confederate troops were accepted, employed and returned as
militia. However,
Armies raised by Congress are of course raised out of the same population as the
militia organized by the states; and to deny to Congress the power to draft a
citizen into the army… because he is a member of the state militia, is to deny the
power to raise an army at all; for, practically, all men fit for service in the army
may be embraced in the militia.95
Brown and Davis were both acutely aware that their respective governments
depended upon loyalty from and authority over the very same individuals. Of
course, the same controversy stood between Washington and Richmond. Brown’s
endeavors to maintain a sphere of authority for Georgia were often criticized, even
by some within Georgia. The Southern Confederacy editorialized on June 20 1862
that militia officers had been, “retained to enrol militia, with no militia left to
train”.
Like Brown, Davis knew that a government’s sovereignty rested upon the
power to pursue its prerogatives. The constitutional clause concerning the
employment of militia was limited to defense. If the Confederacy could not call
state citizens except to defend the states, then it was not a sovereign but a mere
agent. America had already proved that federal centers could not function as
agents for regional sub-units. “If this government cannot call on its arms bearing
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population except as militia, and if the militia can only be called on to repel
invasion, then we should be utterly helpless to vindicate our honor and protect our
rights”. 96
Brown’s final extended reply to Davis paid detailed attention to the fact that
two governments cannot both pursue the vindication of honor and the protection
of rights, calling on a single, shared citizenry. Brown contested Davis’ point that
the Constitution separated war powers for the raising of regular armies from the
calling forth of militia. If Congress were entitled to call the men of the states as
regular armies, why would it ever call them as militia, as the Constitution
supposed it must do? Brown was also skeptical of Davis’ claim that the states
could call forth the militia for state defense, and the Confederacy for national
needs. “If the Conscription law is to… order every man composing the militia out
of the state… how is the state to call forth her own militia… to execute her own
laws?”97
When defending the imperative need of a Conscription Act, Davis had said the
Confederacy was in dire peril and needed, “not any militia, but men to comprise
armies for the Confederate States”. Brown wondered as to the difference. Were
men granted from states a lower caliber of recruit? “Conscription gives you the
very same material”. Was it so Davis could be selective? “The Conscription Act
embraces all, without distinction”.
You do not take the militia? What do you take? You take every man between
certain ages of whom the militia is composed. What is the difference? Simply
this: In one case, you take them with their officers appointed by the states, as the
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Constitution requires…. In the other case you take them all as individuals- get rid
of the state officers- and appoint your own officers.98
According to Brown, Conscription was a flagrant usurpation of state authority.
The Constitution itself stated that state militia was to be officered by their
governor, “while employed in Confederate service”, not merely at the point of
muster, thereafter to be governed by the President, as established in the
Conscription Act. However, Brown went further than mere analysis of
constitutional language to undermine Davis. He continued a theme from his first
letter, and traced the issue back to the early republic. Brown appealed again to the
Founding Fathers to answer the question of whether the states or the Union was
the rightful judge of constitutional construction and practice?
Brown was in no doubt that, “the Constitution is a league between sovereigns”.
The framers of the original Constitution had not conceived of the Union as a
replacement for state sovereignty; “The agent was expected to be rather the
servant of several masters, than the master of several servants”. Nor did the
original Union have any Conscription Act, since the British model had proved
such unnecessary to the war making powers of liberal governments. Furthermore,
“those who established the government of our fathers did not look to it as a great
military power whose people were to live by plundering other nations”. If the
Union were threatened, the Founding Fathers had supposed the same force that
had created the Union would defend it: the people of the states. Likewise Brown
believed that freeborn Confederates needed no compulsion to defend the republic,
rather that they would compel their government.99
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Brown quoted at length from Madison’s warning that, “War is in fact the true
nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a physical force is to be created, and it
is the executive which is to direct it. In war, the public treasures are to be
unlocked, and it is the executive hand which will dispense them…” Such
warnings were as pertinent in 1862 as ever and Brown placed the secessionist
experiment in the very center of the early conflicts between opposing ideologies
of the early republic. “You enunciate a doctrine… first proclaimed, I believe,
almost as strongly, by Mr. Hamilton in the Federalist”. Because of the longevity
of efforts to increase federal authority, Brown claimed no surprise at hearing such
doctrines. His surprise was, “because it found an advocate in you (Davis), whom I
had for many years regarded as one of the ablest and boldest defenders of the
doctrines of the State Rights school”.100
Brown reminded Davis of the doctrines of Jefferson’s Republicans whose 1798
Virginia resolutions declared,
The powers of the Federal Government result from the compacts to which the
states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument
containing that compact…. In the case of deliberate, palpable and dangerous
exercise of other powers not granted by said compact, the states, who are the
parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the
progress of evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities,
rights and liberties appertaining to them.101
Jefferson had called the federal union, “a General Government for special
purposes” with only, “defined powers” delegated to it. “The Government created
by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the
powers delegated to it”. The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions had been clear
that provisions of Congressional authority to, “enact whatever legislation be
100
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deemed necessary…” were, “words meant only to be subsidiary to the execution
of the limited powers (and) ought not to be construed, as themselves to give
unlimited powers, nor… to be taken as to destroy the whole document”.102
By 1860, questions as old as the republic itself had created sufficient
momentum and division to provoke secession. By 1862, they were recreating the
same crippling ideological rifts within the new Confederacy. If the constitutional
clause granting Congressional authority to ‘raise armies’ justified conscription,
argued Brown, then it justified Lincoln in arming freed slaves against the South.
Furthermore, because, “it follows that Congress has absolute control over every
man in the state…”,
It was only necessary to pass a Conscription Law declaring every man in (the
seceding states) to be in the military service of the United States, and that each
should be treated as a deserter if he refused to serve; and that Congress, the Judge,
then decided that this law was “necessary and proper”…. This would have left the
states without a single man at their command.103
The logical conclusion of such admission of authority would have been to accept
that “peaceful secession… the right as revolution for which we are fighting” was
truly an illegal revolution.
Answering the inherited assumptions of the Lost Cause school that Brown and
other defenders of State Rights had fatally wounded Confederate efforts towards
independence, Berringer et al. highlighted the fact that the Confederacy
conscripted a much larger percentage of its population than did the Union.
Furthermore, Brown’s protests did not indicate that Georgians were universally
anti-administration.
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Despite his troubles with Governors Vance and Brown, Davis managed to win
most of his struggles with the internal governmental structure both on national
and state levels…. Even the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that that draft was
constitutional, whereas the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the Union draft
as unconstitutional.104
By 1860, an expanding and increasingly powerful national political economy
was producing an expanding and increasingly powerful modern nation state. To
resist this force, Southern states attempted to revert to state sovereignty, retaining
the rights and powers of nation states in local apparatus. This failed because the
need for federal machinery produced a concurrent necessary and inevitable
tendency towards centralization in the Confederacy. Moreover, the new counterfederal state failed, and the crucible of civil war revealed the dominance of the
senior American republic against the atrophy of the challenger.
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Chapter Two: Maintaining Her Majesty’s neutrality in the persons of her
subjects105

On February 6 1861, three weeks after Georgia seceded, the British merchant
vessel Kalos was at port in Savannah. For some reason, Captain Vaughan allowed
a black ship hand to eat dinner at his table in the captain’s cabin. When word got
out via the first mate, a local mob led by a Savannah secret society called the
‘Rattlesnake club’ quickly formed. Fearing that Vaughan was of abolitionist
leanings the mob dragged the Captain from his ship. They severely beat him,
tarred and feathered him, and hung him up to learn that free Georgians would not
suffer themselves to entertain abolitionist rabble-rousers of any nationality. Of
course, Vaughan’s nationality was of major significance. The case was discussed
in parliament where Mr. Thomas Duncombe MP and Lord Palmerston debated
whether or not Her Majesty’s consul had done as much as possible in defense of
this distressed Briton. Duncombe was under the mistaken impression that the
consul, Edward Molyneux, a veteran of the Foreign Office resident in Savannah
almost a decade, had been openly supporting secession in speech and dress and
was not committed enough to Her Majesty’s subjects.106
Either Duncombe was misinformed, or he had misunderstood the incident. He
was certainly wrong about Molyneux. The consul was as loyal a servant of the
Crown as ever in 1861, and had written to Brown urging intervention and justice
for Her Majesty’s subject. However, both Duncombe and Palmerston were clear
on the significance of the incident. If it had, as Duncombe had understood, taken
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place after secession, it potentially signaled unwillingness in the secessionist
governments to recognize and protect the rights and prerogatives of the sovereign
Crown as represented in the persons of Her Majesty’s subjects. Such attitudes
would produce disruptive and, for the Confederates, disastrous effects on
diplomatic relations. They would severely undermine the possibility of British
recognition. Lord Lyons informed Molyneux by telegram the day of the
disturbance, “The powers of Europe will be little disposed to look with favours
upon governments which allow such lawlessness”107. However, secessionist
governments, state and federal, needed to be jealous for more than simply
recognition and acceptance of their independence and sovereignty on the world
stage. Primarily, it was imperative to establish Confederate sovereignty and
authority over individuals within Confederate territory. The dual needs of
domestic, internal sovereignty on one hand, and recognition and external
sovereignty on the other, would ultimately prove irreconcilable. Confederates
faced a choice between hoping for international goodwill, and maintaining
domestic governments in their own sphere. On December 10 1861, Brown wrote
to Molyneux, who protested whenever necessary if the neutrality of Britons was
not respected, informing him that,
It will at all times be most agreeable to the authorities of Georgia to afford the
same measure of protection, and relief to any of Her Majesty’s subjects, who may
be insulted or injured within the limits of this state which our laws afford the
citizens of this state, but it is not in my power to apply a rule of relief in their
favor which does not apply in favor of the of the citizens of Georgia.108
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Sovereign states require loyalty, obedience and internalization of their right to
rule from their citizens. They also need other states to accept them as fellow
nations and to recognize their sovereign right to protect and judge the citizens they
claim, wherever they may be. The innate tension between these prerogatives was
clear in the case of Captain Vaughan. If foreign citizens resident in a state claim
rights and privileges that interfere with their host state’s sovereignty, there must
be a compromise. The process of compromise between sovereign governments is
called diplomacy. The diplomatic history of the Civil War played no small part in
the crisis of the American republic, and the final and full establishment of Union
sovereignty. In the Civil War the states struggled over whether federal machinery
above them had a right to access their citizens directly and not through the states.
Likewise, the European powers struggled to protect their citizens and
prerogatives. They felt their way carefully through the war, looking to
compromise with the fellow sovereign state most able to satisfactorily guarantee
their rights.
In the standard setting early work on Civil War diplomacy, King Cotton
Diplomacy, Frank Owsley claimed that the British government never responded
favorably to Napoleon III’s desire to recognize the Confederacy because the war
was too profitable for the empire. Northern grain was as vital to England’s
industrial centers as Southern cotton. Also, war profits from exporting arms,
heavy goods, leather, salt, and wool, combined with the increasing dominance
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Britain’s Atlantic shipping fleet gained from Confederate destruction of “Yankee
Clippers”, made Palmerston disinclined to look for an early end to conflict.109
Subsequent writers argued that the relationship between Britain and its former
colonies was not so simple. British political and public opinion was markedly
ambiguous, and often uninformed. Harold Hyman explained in Heard Around the
World that Britons tended to view America in European terms, as a national unit
with its center in Washington. As British trade with, and investments in, America
continued to increase, American stability became vital. Walter Bagehot
editorialized consistently in the Economist against the principle of divided
sovereignty. His ideas found many other subscribers, such as Robert Lowe MP,
who stated in 1866 that it was in America’s interest to have, “(as few) obstacles
interposed between the good sense and will of the nation and the action of the
government (as possible)”. Blockade-runners kept supplies of Southern goods just
high enough to avert unbearable crises in British industry, thus making ProSouthern spokesmen like John Roebuck MP appear too personal in their agenda.
On the other hand, the Union cause had more consistent mass appeal. Pro-Union
leader in the commons John Bright MP said, “There is nothing more worthy of
reverence and obedience… than the freely chosen magistrate of a free people”.110
D. P. Crook believed that, “(William) Gladstone personified (British)
ambiguity, wanting an armistice to save the remnants of American liberty but
believing that, “a unified Republic best suited British interests”. Crook argued that
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on the one hand Victorian commitments to humanitarian concerns (at least in
‘civilized’ countries) gave real impetus to the conviction that the South could not
be forced to reunify and should be peaceably released. On the other hand, the days
when European powers hoped to gain direct influence in North America were long
gone. There had been a European disengagement from American affairs due to
“American national maturation”. A separation of North and South would
destabilize North America and cause the powers of Europe, who were increasingly
engaged elsewhere in the world, to have to compete for influence in an area which
had, for over half a century, been seen as America’s sphere.111
Howard Jones followed Crooks’ conclusions with his study, Union in Peril,
emphasizing the importance of Victorian, “expressions of concern for othersincluding Americans on both sides of the conflict- (which) were not uncommon
on all levels of British society”. Jones focused on the British cabinet under
Palmerston, arguing that Russell and Gladstone were the most active leaders
seeking intervention, always on humanitarian grounds. The counterweight to
humanitarian interest was self-interest. Britain ultimately failed to commit because
the Confederacy failed at crucial moments, like Antietam, to prove itself on the
field, thus making the intervention recognition would necessitate too costly. Such
involvement would be at odds with Britain’s other prerogatives. “The likelihood
of conflict with the North outweighed the attraction of intervention. Not only was
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Canada indefensible, but Palmerston feared an outbreak of war in Europe caused
by its own set of problems”.112
Frank Merli concluded that one of the most important factors deciding against
intervention was the fact that, “the rise and fall of Davis’ government depended
more than he knew on the way the British government perceived his efforts”.
Davis sent inexperienced, ill-chosen representatives to England, such as James
Murray Mason, the ultra fire-eater author of the Fugitive Slave Act, whose
uncouth ways were intolerable to Victorian, abolitionist London society.113
The British government was more directly involved in the Civil War than many
Americans realized, both at the time and subsequently. Indeed, the interests of
Britain and other European powers in America’s domestic war were not limited to
the diplomacy of recognition. The recognition debate boils down to an
international dialogue committing Europe to self-interested neutrality that
ultimately favored the Union (though Lincoln’s administration and Northerners in
general showed only bitterness towards the Crown). The concurrent process was a
ground level diplomacy carried on by Lord Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons, the
British ambassador at Washington, and the British consuls throughout both the
United and Confederate States. This diplomatic history, which may be called the
diplomacy of sovereignty, was part of the history of recognition, since the
representatives of the Crown worked to maintain relations with local authorities
according to Foreign Office instructions. It was also part of the history of the
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rising nation state and the battle for governmental authority over persons in
America.
In 1954, against the backdrop of McCarthyism Harold Hyman published The
Era of the Oath, a history of the cynical and invasive use the federal government
made of loyalty oaths in war and Reconstruction. Hyman demonstrated the radical
growth of coercive power gained by the Union from the oath. Congress first
extended the employment of the traditional civil service oath (which pledged
obedience and protection to the Constitution), and then in 1862 introduced the
‘iron clad oath’ swearing loyalty to the constitution both future and past! Senator
James A. Bayard Jr. of Delaware opposed the oath, claiming that Senators were
officers of the states, not the federal government, and stating that the Constitution
only demands future loyalty from its servants. “Qualifications for (the
Constitution’s) servants” were established, said Bayard, “to exclude all others as
prerequisites”.114
Oaths were demanded of Americans abroad through US consuls, often
provoking protests from host nations. They were demanded of foreign citizens in
front line areas of America like New Orleans. They were tied to the most basic
daily events in Border States like buying food from government stores. Ultimately
the purpose of oaths was to allow greater punishment for traitors since
Confederates captured with certificates of oath on their person frequently faced
death. As Linda Kerber highlighted, loyalty is ultimately only a negative
obligation to refrain from treason. A government’s integrity depends upon its
ability to prevent disloyalty and compel support. Governments must also be able
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to always guarantee the former, and if necessary the latter, from foreign residents.
Thus, in the persons of British subjects, Her Majesty’s government was directly
involved in the conflict over hegemonic sovereignty in America.
When C. F. Adams arrived in London on May 13 1861, he discovered that Her
Majesty’s government had that very day declared Britain to be neutral. The North
viewed the act as anti-Union since it conferred upon the Confederacy the status of
neutrals, guaranteeing trading rights and safe harbor in Britain’s ports. It also left
the door open for recognition later. The Confederates welcomed the move,
naturally hoping that it would be the first step towards recognition. Neutrality,
combined with the Foreign Enlistments Act of 1819, proscribed British subjects
from building and equipping ships of war for belligerents, committed Britain to
not break any effective blockade, and established by royal decree that Britons
were not to take part in the conflict.115
Although the US State Department urged Britain to rule out future recognition
of the South, Russell refused. Neutrality was essentially a waiting game.
Intervention and recognition were not clear-cut questions and the mind of
Palmerston’s administration would be made up by the course of events. What was
certain of course was the Crown’s commitment to British national interests.
British trade, property and persons had to be protected and diplomatic relations
maintained as openly and favorably as possible. And Britain’s independence of
action had to be maintained without any course of action being forced upon the
Crown. Nation state sovereignty depends upon complete control and authority
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over a territory, but the justifying ideology for this territorial hegemony is a
philosophy of personal, individual loyalty and possessive state authority. The
Foreign Office was forced to defend an absolute ideology and standard, individual
neutrality, when reality and absolutes were shifting and volatile. Therefore Civil
War diplomacy (as all diplomacy) was characterized by the coexistence of
ideological language and pragmatic reality. Rules were bent, laws and treaties
liberally applied. Ultimately, British claims to sovereignty over Her Majesty’s
subjects had to bend in compromise against the claim of territorial sovereignty
established by the Union.
The continued presence of British Consuls within the Confederacy constituted
something of a dilemma. Sovereign governments cannot entertain foreign agents
operating without their authorization, but the European nations would not
immediately recognize the Confederacy and could not therefore request new
consular exequaturs from Richmond. On the other hand, Confederates needed to
maintain good will with the powers and therefore wished to accept consular
officials within their borders. The theory of state sovereignty and the presecession agency of Washington provided a justifying philosophy which allowed
consuls to stay without openly denying that the new government was the final
authority over all persons within its bounds. Their presence provided the closest
thing Richmond could attain to normative diplomatic discourse. With Confederate
hospitality assured, the consuls proceeded to communicate on political and
diplomatic matters with Confederate authorities, despite such actions being
beyond the limits of their legal roles.
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After serving briefly as Confederate Attorney-General and later Secretary of
War, a task for which he was ill prepared, Judah Benjamin became Secretary of
State in February 1862. It was he who reviewed appeals from foreign consuls to
Richmond for the protection of their national citizens and interests. With his ally
and friend President Jefferson Davis, Benjamin was responsible for Confederate
policy regarding the status of the consuls. He began life in the British West Indies,
the son of London Jews and was a British subject until his family migrated to
Charleston in 1816, where his father took American citizenship. Benjamin
therefore had personal experience of the fluidity of citizenship, and the changeable
nature of sovereignty and loyalty. However, Benjamin was also a lawyer and a
former US Senator and therefore understood the contractual nature of citizenship
and the fundamentality of the integrity of the internal rule of law to nation states.
Benjamin kept patience with the consuls and was lenient towards resident aliens
longer than many critics thought wise, but he did not acknowledge any rights of
foreign governments to dictate policy or law to the aspiring Confederacy.116
In September 1861, Consul Robert Bunch at Charleston sent Robert Mure to
New York with a bag, sealed with the consular seal, containing correspondence of
private British individuals for England and official consular correspondence for
London. Union Secretary of State William Seward had made clear that no person
would be allowed across Union lines without a passport countersigned by him.
Since Mure was carrying letters appertaining to British attempts to secure
Confederate commitment to the 1856 Treaty of Paris, Bunch had not sought the
signature. The Paris Treaty, which America had never signed, abolished
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privateering and guaranteed protection of ships under neutral flags in all maritime
commerce, excepting contraband of war. It also established that nations claiming
blockades and requesting neutrals to refrain from commerce with the blockaded
enemy must legally prove the blockade effective for it to be recognized. Bunch
had sent WH Trescot, assistant Secretary of State for President Buchanan, to
Richmond to appeal to Jefferson Davis’ government for informal commitment to
these principles, and the correspondence Mure carried attested to this dialogue.
The Foreign Office defended Bunch and claimed he was forced to transmit British
mails privately due to disruption to Federal mails and the blockaded ports.
However, by thus approaching Richmond, Bunch blurred the lines between
recognition and diplomatic silence, and in requesting that the Union abide by the
treaty, Britain asked Lincoln’s government to implicitly acknowledge that the
Confederacy was a de facto national state, subject to treaties and rules of warfare,
rather than a localized insurrection.117
Union officers arrested Mure in New York and the bag sparked heated
exchanges between Seward and Russell. Seward quoted US laws stating that no
person below the office of President may engage in unauthorized diplomatic
relations with a foreign state. Like Her Majesty, Seward was attempting to serve
national prerogatives as best possible, guarding against unauthorized movement
and discourse, maintaining territorial and diplomatic integrity. C. F. Adams, the
United States’ envoy to Her Majesty’s Government, complained to Russell that,
“Her majesty’s Government may be relied upon not to complain at one and the
same time of the breach of an international Postal Treaty… and of our resort to a
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measure which is indispensable to complete the ability to fulfill it”.118 Adams
knew that before nation states take concern for diplomacy, they must secure the
integrity of their internal sovereignty, even if they have to bend some ideological
rules in so doing. Russell accused Seward of, “(going) farther than any
acknowledgement of those states which Her Majesty’s Government has made”
because the law proscribing citizens from unauthorized diplomacy as quoted by
Seward could only logically apply if, as Seward denied, the Confederacy was ‘an
enemy state’. To this suggestion, Adams saw no contradiction or inconsistency in
answering that, “The Government of the United States declines to accept any such
interpretation as modifying in the least degree its own rights and powers”119
The Bunch affair was the more interesting for the fact that Mure was of British
birth, cousin to consul William Mure at New Orleans, and a naturalized American.
Bunch informed Lyons that, “He was a Scotchman born and a British subject in
loyalty and feeling, although he had done what numbers do to enable them to hold
property in this country”. Mure claimed both British and American citizenship,
and naturally both Britain and America claimed certain loyalty from him. The
process of discussion and comprise worked out diplomatically resulted in Bunch’s
exequatur being revoked at Washington, although he continued to reside at
Charleston, acting as consul without requesting a new exequatur from Richmond
and taking direction from Lord Lyons. The Confederates accepted this
arrangement until the continued presence of consuls without the extension of
recognition became so odious an affront to its internal integrity that they expelled
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all the consuls. The British continued pursuing their own agenda with whatever
personnel, authority and certainty they could. Most importantly this meant
maintaining national interests in neutrality.120
Facing the uncertainty of events in America after secession, Britain’s consuls
sought direction from Lyons in Washington as to how they might continue to
serve Her Majesty, protecting her subjects from unrecognized authorities with
very real power over them. Lyons’ answers to the troops on the frontline of this
diplomatic cold war were invariably pragmatic in tone, despite the presence of
ideological language regarding citizens and loyalty, nationality and sovereignty.
He informed Molyneux to proceed according to a ‘principle’ to not, “meet any
such questions as may arise out of the present difficulties with reference to
political considerations, but merely with a view to facilitate as far as possible the
continuance of peaceful commerce”. In order to achieve this, Lyons authorized
consuls to deal carefully but openly with the de facto authorities controlling the
seceded states. In this pragmatic vein Lyons instructed Fredric Cridland, viceconsul in Richmond, to, “bear in mind that the government at Richmond has not
been recognized by The Queen… consequently your relations with it must be
unofficial. Transact business with the de facto authorities by personal
communications rather than by writing”.121
The Foreign Office demonstrated consistent desire to maintain the appearance
and form of appropriate legal and diplomatic status in relations with the Union
and Confederate governments, while naturally seeking to pursue national goals as
far as possible. For example, Lyons reminded Bunch in September 1861 that
120

Bunch to Lyons, September 30 1861, FO 115.

85

Royal Navy vessels were not permitted to break a recognized blockade and enter
port at Charleston. Instead, Bunch was to send correspondence for Washington
and London out by boat to Men of War anchored off the coast. It might be
wondered what exactly the difference was between waiting off shore and entering
port when the same diplomatic business would be done either way. Nevertheless,
the Union needed to maintain the form of a blockade while the Crown had
committed to being seen to recognize it.122
Although the Foreign Office explicitly forbade any incursion of naval vessels
into blockaded ports, consuls were to be somewhat more flexible regarding private
shipping. In this question, Lyons took his lead from the Union government itself.
He quoted the decision of Supreme Court, delivered by Chief Justice Roger Taney
on May 15 1858, concerning American shipping entering the Peruvian port of
Iquique while it was in the control of revolutionaries. The Peruvian government
accused the United States of allowing its citizens to break a legal blockade but
Taney asserted,
Nothing can be clearer than that the conquest of a country, or part of a country, by
a public enemy, entitles such enemy to sovereignty and gives him civil dominion
so long as he retains his military possession…. It cannot call the citizens of a third
country to account for obeying the authority which was contemporarily
supreme.123
These instructions were given to Mure at New Orleans in the early days of
secession and set the tone for British attempts to continue normative commercial
activity. British neutrality aimed to secure neutral shipping rights, avoid war and
maintain good relations with Washington by ensuring that naval vessels observed
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the blockade. These measures, combined with official instructions for consuls to
deal unofficially with Confederates, were attempts to secure British property,
trade, wealth and persons in the face of potential disruption and destruction. The
first prerogative of The Crown in this process was to know which individuals
were claimed as British and ensure that American authorities respected these
claims.
From the very beginning of the secessionist experiment, consuls went to
lengths to claim the primacy and finality of British authority over non-naturalized
Britons in America. All governments recognize the neutrality and foreign
allegiance of non-naturalized aliens. However, controversy arose during the Civil
War in the process of discerning which individuals were or were not naturalized,
and how and by whom this was to be decided. On November 28 1861, Edward
Molyneux wrote to Lyons pleading him to ‘interfere’ on behalf of a Briton,
Charles Green, who for a reason unknown to Molyneux Union forces were
holding prisoner at Fort Warren in Boston Harbor. Green had been a resident of
Savannah and a merchant with the House of Andrew Low and co. for thirty-five
years. Molyneux assumed Northern authorities had taken him for some kind of
Confederate, but despite his long residency in Georgia Molyneux claimed him
firmly for the Crown.124
The Foreign Office also insisted upon an official policy of claiming Britons
who had intended to naturalize, but had never actually done so. After Russell and
the law officers considered the question, Lyons issued a circular to the consuls on
August 3 1861. Russell insisted of such persons, “He remains always an alien,
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owing none of the duties and entitled to none of the peculiar protections of
allegiance”. The circular instructed that issuing passports to persons claiming
British citizenship was, “a matter for your discretion and not one of strict legal
right”. Thus, it maintained Her Majesty’s claim to be arbiter of the rights and
status of Britons in the world.125
The affidavits of citizenship that aliens needed to procure in order to gain
passports and/or protection from the Crown’s representatives in America were
simple. A small one-page certificate attesting to the fact that the individual had
sworn to their citizenship, signed by a Justice of the Peace, was sufficient. An
affidavit for Leonard Gibson of Macon, Georgia signed on January 21 1863 by the
honorable A. H. Wayne simply stated that Gibson had been resident in Macon
since 1858 but was not naturalized. It read that Gibson, “says on oath he is a
British Subject and citizen and owes his allegiance to and claims the protection of
the English Government”. A similar document for John Burke of Bibb County,
Georgia, signed on March 6 1863 by the honorable A. H. Wyche, made clear that
Burke, though present in America since 1850, both North and South, “does not
now intend to reside in either government permanently”.126
Such claims of obligatory, reciprocal loyalty from subjects bound the Crown to
interpose and were the basis of Britain’s sovereign claims to rights in America.
The certificates functioned as contracts of ownership. Their diplomatic
significance was that such ownership was frequently contested. Her majesty’s
government rendered the royal proclamation of neutrality in absolute terms.
Britain and all under the Crown were entirely neutral in all questions relating to
125
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the American conflict. Of course, Her Majesty could proclaim whatever she might
choose. Words mean nothing without authority to see them fulfilled. It therefore
fell to the consuls to be the defenders not simply of Her Majesty’s subjects, but of
the very integrity of her rule.
I transmit to you a copy herewith of a proclamation the Queen has been pleased to
give warning to Her Majesty’s subjects against taking part in the hostilities which
have broken out in the United States. I have to instruct you to exhibit this
proclamation in your consular office and to take suitable steps for (the protection)
of Her Majesty’s subjects residing or entering within your jurisdiction, taking care
however to do so in a manner best calculated to avoid wounding the sensibilities
of the authorities in the place where you reside.127
It was therefore, a priority of the highest order to keep Britons from bearing
arms, willingly or otherwise. Consuls were entrusted with the responsibility of
warning Britons against volunteering, especially in Confederate service, which
would leave them liable to treatment as traitors not enemy prisoners if captured.
Consuls also had to seek justice for Britons wrongfully treated with imprisonment
or forced enrollment, if necessary at the risk of affronting the assumed rights of
Confederate authorities.
The conflict between governments for claims to citizens began with the first
mobilization for war. The states, Confederacy and Union all made claims to the
same individuals, and matters were complicated further when governments
ostensibly foreign to the war could also claim those individuals. On August 3
1861, Lyons wrote to Allan Fullarton, who was acting consul at Savannah with
Molyneux in England for reasons of health, requesting that he inquire into the fate
of Mr. Patrick Walsh’s son who, while working in a shop in Macon, had been
forced into the Floyd Rifles. These were the very same Floyd Rifles Brown had
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submitted to Confederate service in Virginia that April. In all his attacks upon
Confederate conscription Brown argued that the independence struggle needed no
more access to men than the states were able to guarantee. However, in many
cases attempts to make such provision provoked diplomatic counter-claims to the
individual citizens governors were depending upon to fill their ranks.128
On July 28 1862, Fredrick Cridland, wrote at length to William Stuart, British
chargé d'affairs in Washington, with details of the status of Britons in Virginia.
Stuart was pursuing the release of William Keith, a Briton captured in
Confederate service before Richmond who claimed to his Union captors to have
been serving against his will. Cridland informed Stuart that in the first week of
June the Confederate conscription office had opened in Richmond and patrols had
begun stopping and arresting men thought to be liable for enrollment. Cridland
accused enrolling officers of being, “perfectly ignorant of all law” and informed
Stuart that, “In consequence of these outrages the applications of British subjects
at the consulate daily were so innumerable (as to cause) an entire suspension of
business”. Keith, who had been resident in Richmond five years but had not
naturalized or married, had been arrested and enrolled on June 19. Cridland had
written to Confederate war secretary Randolph the following day regarding the
case. Randolph replied eight days later promising to look into the case, but could
only inform Cridland of his discovery that Keith had been captured.129
Lyons also received many similar complaints from his consuls resident within
the loyal states. As Northern authorities struggled to find men to put into the field,
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inevitably Britons were swept up with the tide. On October 23 1862 E. M.
Archibald, Her Majesty’s consul at New York, informed Lyons that three men,
Edward Quinn, John Sheppard and Michael Hopkins, all resident in Pennsylvania,
had been drafted into US service and issued papers of American citizenship.
Archibald assured Lyons, “I have ascertained that these parties are subjects who
have not been naturalized in this country… and have not exercised the peculiar
privileges of American citizenship”. In issuing these men with a piece of paper,
Union authorities were claiming a right over them which implicitly had not
existed previously. As Britons, the men were not liable for conscription, but once
the United States claimed them, the very same men, regardless of protest, were
taken into service for ‘their’ government.130
Throughout America, men claiming British protection, either from a simple
desire to avoid active service, or from genuine loyalties, must have shared the
dread Thomas Hogan of Augusta expressed to Fullarton in July 1863. Hogan
complained that the Adjutant General of Georgia Henry Wayne had published a
letter in the Augusta paper stating that foreigners were liable for draft. Hogan
cynically commented, “I suspect this (article) is the only authority they have to
take us if they will”. Hogan claimed he had tried to leave the state and had a
passport for Richmond from the consul’s office. However, after Henry Wayne’s
letter, the city passport office had shut down and refused to issue passes for
resident aliens. “So now I and a great many others who was ready is disappointed
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(sic)…. I am in great dread that I will be drafted, and so are all the other British
subjects”.131
Although many Britons expressed fear, and encountered actual abuse from
enrolling officers, overall the goodwill of Confederate and state authorities in the
South lasted through the first half of the war. The desire of Confederates to
maintain relations with Britain as close as possible to amicable and normative
despite the absence of full recognition, ensured that Her Majesty’s consuls were
able to find favorable responses to most of their appeals. They continued to use
the opportunities Confederates allowed them to act as pseudo-ambassadors for
Her majesty to the un-recognized republic.
Cridland wrote to William Stuart on October 16 1862, regarding British
subjects who had joined Confederate service on an initial twelve-month service as
volunteers without naturalizing. “I can state that to my certain knowledge
hundreds of British subjects have of late obtained their discharge from the said
army on proving their nationality and of their having no domicil in America”.
Two days later Cridland followed up on the case of William Keith informing
Lyons that Keith, along with some other men, had escaped Union captivity and
upon appeal being made to secretary Randolph, had been released from
Confederate service. Cridland assured Lyons that Confederate authorities
generally released Britons without paperwork when he, as consul, presented proof
of their citizenship. Cridland assured, “The secretary of war seems determined not
to allow any violation of the rights of aliens”. Cridland also repeated his
commitment to, “at all times be directed against the pretensions of the so styled
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Confederate government to exact military service from British subjects domiciled
or not domiciled in the South.”132
Despite such bold and increasingly aggressive pursuit of the rights of Her
Majesty’s subjects abroad, the consuls enjoyed continued shows of goodwill, from
government officials at least, well into 1863. Fullarton assured Lyons in
December 1861 that when Britons sought militia exemption at his office, “my
advice has invariably been to make the affidavit prescribed by law. In no case has
complaint afterwards reached me”133
In September 1862 James Randolph replied to concerns voiced by James
Magee at Mobile by repeating to the consul instructions that he had sent Major
Swanson, commanding officer at Camp Watts, Alabama. Randolph directed
Swanson, “Instruct your enrolling officers and especially those at Mobile, not to
enroll foreigners unless they are permanent residents of the Confederate States,
and that the oath of the party… is usually deemed by the Department as sufficient
proof in such cases”. Randolph insisted that his department had, “never yet failed
to discharge a foreigner when the consul, after examination, found that they were
not domiciled in the Confederate States”. Randolph’s reiteration of Confederate
restraint and goodwill only met with further complaints from Magee who
highlighted the case of John Martin, J. B. Reid and Michael Slattery. These men,
he had learnt that very day, were, “thrown into a filthy jail and confined at Major
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(William) Clarke’s convenience…. I am also informed that they are prevented
from corresponding with their consul”.134
Following up on this case on September 24 1862, Magee complained, “I must
lodge a complaint against this Major Clarke for such unwarrantable proceedings
contrary to the usage of any government”. The language of the complaint was
significant and telling. Magee subtly demanded that the Confederacy behave the
way Her Majesty’s government expected civilized nations having dealings with
the Crown to behave, while refusing to recognize and treat it as any such state.
Again, a British consul was going beyond the limits of commercial employment,
acting as a diplomatic official, and unofficially making official requests of
Confederate authorities for British prerogatives to be respected. Again,
Confederate authorities showed willingness to entertain such actions.135
Magee and Randolph continued to correspond through late 1862, with Magee
making constant complaint against Clarke and his activities as enrolling officer.
On October 10, Clarke conscripted William Hensbury, confiscated his British
passport and even released a Frenchman and an Italian in Hensbury’s presence!
Earlier that day Randolph had sent Magee a copy of War Department General
Order 30, April 28 1862, which directed department personnel as to how they
were to implement the Conscription Act. Section XI of this order stipulated that
taking an oath before enroling officers and presenting a certificate was sufficient
for exemption. Randolph had reminded Clarke of the Order and stated, “All
enrolling officers are hereby prohibited from enrolling, as conscripts, foreigners
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not domiciled in the Confederate States”. A few weeks later, Randolph wrote
assuring Fullarton in Savannah that, “certificates from the consuls of foreign
governments have been, and will continue to be, treated with due respect by the
department, and all enrolling officers are required to exempt non-domiciled
foreigners from conscription. Mistakes will occur however…”136
Confederate officials were eager to appear to be accommodating British
requests and acknowledging the prerogatives of the Crown, even at the expense of
their own struggle. Her Majesty’s officials couched the claims they made in
pursuit of those prerogatives in absolute terms of rights, as though Her Majesty’s
sovereignty literally extended into America with her subjects. As the war
progressed, Confederate needs grew direr and their revolution more desperate, and
the claims of the consuls became more offensive and unbearable. However,
careful analysis of the language used by state and Confederate officials
concerning foreigners and the right of exemption reveals that even when
secessionists were co-operating with Her Majesty’s claims, they always made
reservations. These reservations implied that Her Majesty could have no access to
her subjects within the Confederacy except through Confederate governments, and
with their blessing.
The Confederate counter-revolution certainly did, as Merli argued, depend
more than Davis realized upon British recognition. However, it depended more
immediately upon the establishment of complete and final Confederate authority
within the seceded States. Union forces captured Fort Pulaski on April 13 1862
and began to range heavy siege fire upon Savannah from Tybee Island. Georgia
136
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military authorities responded by enlisting all Savannah’s able-bodied men to
defend the port city. Molyneux requested that British subjects be exempted from
such service but,
Upon remonstrating with (the general commanding the state forces) in favour of
British subjects, on the grounds that the law in question was framed to meet the
case of foreign invasion and not civil war, he replied that any application of such
a course would practically concede that the Confederacy was still a part of the
United States and not an independent nation as it claims.137
The ‘law in question’ referred to was the law of exemptions from Georgia militia
duty. Adjutant General of Georgia, Henry C. Wayne, wrote to Molyneux on
February 26 1862, and somewhat unreassuringly reassured him that, “should any
alien be drafted, (the governor) will immediately, in his discretion, on the
representations of his consul, direct his relief from military duty”. Wayne claimed
recourse to, “the recognized international principle that in cases of invasion aliens
may be required to take up arms”. This international principle had been
established in Georgia law by the 1824 Militia Act which stated, “All aliens
residing or at any time being within the State of Georgia shall be exempt from the
performance of all ordinary militia duty, except parole duty, alarm duty and duties
required for the suppression of insurrection, invasion or conflagration”. The Act
also stipulated that aliens must register with an oath taken before a Justice of the
Peace who must then sign an affidavit attesting to said alien’s exemption.
Combined, these two principles, established decades before the war, amounted to
an exemption of aliens from militia duty unless the State of Georgia felt that such
service was necessary. They also made qualified alien citizenship dependent upon
the agreement and signature of a state official. In other words, the ‘rights’ of
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citizens of foreign sovereigns were not really rights at all, but privileges
guaranteed by Georgia, which could be revoked at the state’s pleasure.138
On May 22 1862, the Confederate Attorney General, Thomas Watts, issued
general order 38 stating, “the question of domicil, or permanent residence is,
however, a question of law and should be determined from the facts of the case
and not by the opinion or oath of the party”. Domicil was a contemporary concept
of international law functioning as a kind of forerunner to modern immigration
proceedings. The term meant permanent residence and could be established in a
variety of ways, including property ownership, exercising the franchise, militia
enrollment, or, more obviously, by taking a naturalization oath. As General Order
30 rightly established, domicil was a matter of international law. The United
States Constitution was also matter of law, but when one law affects more than
one government claiming to be the final and sovereign judge of that law’s
meaning and usage, conflict is inevitable. The question of who was domiciled, and
what could be claimed from such persons, was as much a necessary constitutional
struggle as the Civil War itself.139
Cridland complained to Randolph on June 25 1862, of the unreasonable trials
Britons would be subject to if secessionists insisted upon forcing them into the
conflict against their sovereign’s stated will. “Supposing that they should not
return to their native country, is it just by the exercise of the power complained of
to compel them to lose Her Majesty’s protection through her official agents in this
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country?” Cridland went on to argue that International law, “condemns the
enforcement of conditions hostile to the interests of foreigners or different from
general usage unless it may be specified before immigration”. This argument went
as far as claiming for Britons an absolute right to inconvenience their host
government to any necessary length in order to ensure continued maintenance of
the conditions for which they migrated. It attempted to bind the Union and
Confederacy both in a contractual, obligatory relationship to alien individuals,
without even the suggestion of mutuality. It hardly needs stating that any selfrespecting sovereign state can never accept such claims; Britain included.140
British consuls committed themselves to appealing to local authorities on
behalf of any distressed Britons. However, despite these appeals being couched in
the language of absolute allegiance of British subjects to their final and only
sovereign, the Foreign Office had to accept that host governments do have some
rights over domiciled foreigners. Obviously the Crown would never operate under
restraints on internal British affairs placed upon it by foreign states jealous for
their citizens resident in Britain. Lyons consistently instructed the consuls to
appeal for release of Britons in every case, and always argued that the Civil War
was not a foreign invasion, therefore Southern states were wrong to impress Her
Majesty’s subjects into service. He did however admit, “there is no rule or
principle in international law which prohibits the government of any country from
requiring aliens resident within its territories to serve in the militia or police the
country, or to contribute to the support of such establishments”.141
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The political philosophy of final sovereignty is the basis of all modern nation
states, and this sovereignty theory rests on authority over individuals, which
produces hegemonic rule within a given territory. Migration is the remainder to
this equation of political science. When individuals migrate, claims of multiple
sovereigns are active in the same sphere and regarding the same persons. As of the
histories of the early American republic and the State Rights battles of
Confederate politics demonstrate, conflict, compromise and submission must
result from such questions. The diplomacy of the Civil War demonstrates that for
their own integrity, sovereign governments must ultimately be willing to concede
some authority over their claimed citizens abroad, in order to protect the ideology
of internal hegemony in international law. In the Civil War, diplomacy was
uncertain and cautious because official dialogue with the Confederacy was
impossible, and Her Majesty’s government was depending largely on diplomats
who were only legally empowered to act commercially. Further difficulties
existed because Britain’s legal rights in America were debatable, being subject to
interpretations as to the nature of the war. This of course guaranteed that South
and North would see each question in lights as contrary as they were predicable.
When Foreign Office policy was to request the neutrality of Britons because the
Civil War was not a foreign invasion, Confederates could not accept such claims.
Therefore, success was always dependent upon the good standing and persuasive
skills of the consuls and continued Confederate goodwill.
Cridland admitted these host government rights over domiciled aliens to
Randolph on June 25 1862, but continued to press for favor toward Britons
anyway,
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I am informed that while Her Majesty’s government might well be content to
leave British subjects voluntarily domiciled in a foreign country, liable to all the
obligations incident to such foreign domicile, including… service in the militia, or
national guard, or local police, for the maintenance of internal peace and order, or
to a limited extent, the defence of that territory from foreign invasion, it is not
reasonable to expect that Her Majesty’s government should in the present state of
things in this country remain entirely passive under the treatment to which it
appears British subjects are actually exposed…142
Fredrick Cridland continued to support Britons. He used his influence and long
held respect in Richmond society to act in a personal political way where absolute
rights did not exist. He and other consuls continued to see success well into 1863,
at least with government officials, if not always enrolling officers. However, local
authorities always reserved their rights to internal sovereignty. On October 13
1862, Cridland wrote to Lyons complaining of increasing difficulties faced in
Richmond by Britons due to section I of article III of the March 1862, “Act
imposing taxes for the support of the Government”. The Act read, “Be it enacted
that no license shall be granted to any person except a citizen of the Confederate
States and except to such a person who shall have declared an oath… to become a
citizen”. The licenses the Act referred to were for any kind of merchant
conducting business in Confederate towns, and the oath mentioned demanded that
persons swearing, “renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince”.143
Cridland was convinced that, “the principle object in view (with the Act) was
to test the loyalty of unnaturalized aliens- who without in any way identifying
themselves with the country, were enjoying many privileges and could carry out
every act of trade while the citizens of Virginia were compelled to enroll
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themselves in defence of their homes”. According to Cridland, many Britons had
had to leave Virginia after experiencing unfair pressure to renounce their native
citizenship due to conditions not in existence when they settled in America.
However, the Foreign Office could do very little about it. Objections could be
registered, but how could a mere consul demand that a government staking a
claim to sovereignty and seeking internal hegemony change its very laws?144
The legal status of minor children was another question of significance in
which American law made certain that America’s residents would answer to
American government. Unsure of his rights and prerogatives in cases where
migration blurred the boundaries of citizenship, Cridland wrote to Lyons in
August 1862 requesting a decision on the legal relation of the Crown to minors of
British parentage, resident in America. He quoted from the Yate’s Digest laws of
Virginia to show that American states considered,

The children of any person duly naturalized under the laws of the United States…
being under the age of twenty one years at the time their parents naturalized, or
admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States be
considered as citizens; and the children of persons who are now, or have been,
citizens of the United States, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
laws of the United States, be considered as citizens….145
In American law therefore, children of foreigners settling in America were
claimed as American, even if their parents might cease to be American citizens.
Concurrently, minors of American birth remained American citizens even
overseas. In October 1862, Cridland wrote to Lyons regarding the case of Thomas
Atkins, a Richmond man with a British father who had naturalized while Thomas
was a minor. Lyons informed Cridland that he would not be able to help the man
144
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escape military service as a British subject. “Although he would have no difficulty
in being recognized as such in Great Britain yet by the laws of the United States
you apprehend that he may be claimed as a citizen thereof and duties required of
him accordingly”. Stuart followed this correspondence with an opinion in advance
of the law officers’ official ruling, stating that, “(minors) brought to this country
be considered, as between the United States and British governments to belong
during their minority to the adopted country of their father”. This opinion
reaffirmed the importance of the government claims therein referred to. If
governments can claim individual citizens, and justify such claims, they become
sovereign over their future generations, and ‘in a multitude of people is the glory
of a king.’146
During the long Canadian winters the scarcity of work frequently pushed many
British Canadians south down the Mississippi valley in search of casual, seasonal
occupation. 1861-62 was no exception. Despite the war, many Britons moved
south assuming their foreign citizenship would keep them free of the conflict, and
hoping that labor shortages would allow their work to fetch high prices. John
Robertson and Samuel Armstrong were among these migrants. While in the
seceded states however, both men were arrested, and impressed into Confederate
service. The men met at Camp Douglas in Illinois, having become Union
prisoners of war. Armstrong wrote an appeal to Her Majesty’s consul at Chicago,
Edward Wilkins. He declared, “the cause of my enlisting was compelled, that is to
be pressed, which I consider not lawful…”. Robinson, who had fled his

145

Cridland to Lyons, August 25 1862, FO 115. Author’s italics.
Cridland to Lyons, October 17 1862 FO 115; Stuart to Cridland, October 22, Ibid.; Proverbs
14:24 (ESV).
146

102

Confederate unit and surrendered to captain T.G. Pitcher of the 22nd Illinois in
Tennessee, similarly protested against his treatment. He informed Wilkins, “I have
gone south and as I would not join the Confederate army I was imprisoned on
suspicion of being an abolitionist. I was afterwards forced into the Confederate
army…”147
Colonel James A. Mulligan of the 23rd Illinois, the Union hero of Lexington,
commanded Camp Douglas. Mulligan was a second-generation Irish immigrant,
raised in Chicago. Being not far removed from British subject status he
understood very well the conflicts of mixed or uncertain citizenship. Wilkins
wrote a letter of appeal for Johnson and Robinson to Colonel Kelton, acting
commander of the department of the Mississippi head quarters, on April 26 1862.
He requested favor and apologized that, “it would be next to impossible to obtain
satisfactory legal evidence as to the truth of the statements of such persons… it
might be well that some rule should be adopted by the department”. Although
Wilkins desired a general principle for such cases, he knew his only real recourse
was to personal politics. He referred to his ‘personal connection’ with Colonel
Mulligan from the Irishman’s time as district attorney of Northern Illinois, and
expressed confidence that co-operation would be forthcoming. Co-operation was
certainly necessary as month by month the number of Britons facing such dire
circumstances increased. Wilkins informed Lyons that in November 1861 he had
traveled to Cairo, Illinois to meet with British prisoners and discovered them all to
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have been volunteers. As the war progressed into 1862 however, many Britons
were being forced to serve an increasingly desperate Confederacy.148
Earlier in May 1862 Lyons had corresponded with Cridland in Richmond over
the issue of volunteers. Their letters demonstrated the limits of sovereignty over
individuals, which rested upon the obedient fulfillment of basic obligations of
loyalty. While the jealous servants of the Crown were determined to defend even
domiciled Britons mustered to serve in a war they refused to accept as ‘foreign
invasion’, they could not defend Britons who had rejected Her Majesty’s
protection voluntarily. Lyons instructed Cridland categorically, “You cannot be
expected to take part in any dispute or discussions between men so enlisted and
the ‘confederate’ government”. Foreign Office policy was made explicitly clear:
“British subjects who have disobeyed the law of England and the Queen’s
proclamation are not entitled to the same consideration… as those who have
faithfully adhered to this duty and allegiance”. Some months later William Stuart
informed Cridland that Northern consuls were not interceding on behalf of Britons
who had volunteered for Union service for specified terms when Union
conscription subsequently extended those terms. Stuart referred to such
arrangements as contracts, and since Britons had voluntarily removed themselves
from neutrality, Her Majesty’s government was no party to such. All Cridland
could do was request that Randolph treat British subjects ‘in good faith’. For cases
such as William Keith however, Stuart reiterated, “It is most unjust to subject
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foreigners who have acquired this domicile with a very different understanding of
its obligations, to violate the neutrality required upon them…”149
In the same month that Lyon’s sent these instructions to Cridland, he wrote
similarly to acting consul Francis Wilkins at St. Louis. Lyons told Wilkins that,
“British subjects enlisting or taking part in any warlike or military operation,
without the Royal license, forfeit, while so enlisted or serving, right to British
protection”. Lyons made clear that it would not be reasonable to attempt to pursue
British rights so blindly as to trample on the sovereign rights of the United States.
He stated that, “the United States government is entitled prima facie to respond as
enemies, and treat as prisoners of war, all persons whom it finds in arms against
it”. The United States was a government recognized by the Crown, a fellow
sovereign state with its own claims within its territories. Her Majesty was bound
by honor to recognize such rights, even over her own subjects. Since the Union
might gain prisoner exchange or other advantages from such prisoners it would be
unfair to demand their release and expect the US government to disadvantage its
pursuit of a war which Britain recognized its right to wage. Therefore Lyons
instructed, “You should abstain from making any formal official demand for the
liberation of such prisoners, as of right- and you should not call upon United
States authorities to lay down any general rule…”150
The Foreign Office did however, authorize the consuls to continue exerting
personal influence and requesting unofficially that Britons be shown favor. In a
letter dated May 19, Brigadier General W. S. Ketchum, acting inspector of
prisoners for the department of the Mississippi, wrote to Major General H. W.
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Halleck, commander of the Union army in Missouri. Ketchum instructed Halleck
to use his ‘discretion’ in matters of Britons captured while serving the
Confederacy against their will. Wilkins then informed Lyons, “In exercise of the
discretion given to Major-General Halleck in that letter he has caused an order to
be issued for the release of the prisoners referred to (in my previous letter)”.151
Shortly after this triumph however, Francis Wilkins received a list of some
three hundred British prisoners, all claiming to have been serving against their
will, being held as prisoners at the Chicago and Alton military prisons. Wilkins
attempted to secure their release by quoting the order issued by Halleck under the
authority granted to him from Major-General Buckingham, Ketchum’s superior at
the department, but this appeal failed. Colonal William Hoffman was now
controlling the fate of these men as the Commissary General of Prisoners. Wilkins
traveled to Chicago to meet with Hoffman but was not allowed access to the men
without permission from Washington. The matter was finally concluded when,
after personal appeal, General Halleck released several of the prisoners, under
instructions that they not return to the Confederacy. Halleck further informed
Wilkins that he was not authorized, “to interfere further on behalf of unfortunate
persons included in the list”.152
Throughout the first two years following secession, British consuls acted
however possible to keep Britons from undermining royal neutrality and to defend
Britons who had been forced into belligerent status. The diplomacy of this
individual-focused ideological sovereignty was bound up with the diplomacy of
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recognition. It was also limited and defined by the laws of territorial sovereignty
and nation state authority. While Confederates desired friendly relations with
Britain and were eager to appease and please the Crown, British demands, which
denied Confederates valuable men and mocked Southern claims to national
independence and self-government, were increasingly unbearable. On the other
hand, while Britons serving the Union in arms were just as un-neutral as those
serving in the South, the Foreign Office was bound by international law, and a
need to recognize the absolute rights of all national governments to control of
their own internal affairs, to concede to the Union many of the rights over
individual Britons which it vehemently denied the pretending Confederates.
Although, sovereignty theory appears initially to have two parts: state authority
over individual nationals, and governmental territorial hegemony. However,
analysis of the nature of diplomacy, especially in the American Civil War,
demonstrates that foreign states cannot defend their citizens abroad without the
blessing and goodwill of the sovereign government hosting them, unless by force.
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Chapter Three: “Instructions issued from hence to Her Majesty’s Consuls
would produce an irritating effect upon the Confederate authorities”153

William Treen left Britain as a sailor aboard the commercial vessel Bellwood on
October 3 1862. Shortly after he stepped ashore in New York on November 8 a
press gang seized and arrested the unfortunate sailor. They took him to a hotel and
presented him to enrolling officer Captain Gormon and although Treen produced
satisfactory proof attesting to his nationality, “said Captain Gormon disregarded
all testimony”. Gormon sent Treen to a jail for four days and charged $5 for the
privilege of his upkeep. He was then sent to Newport News, Virginia, undressed,
given military uniform, and taken to the commanding officer, Brigadier General
Michael Corcoran. According to Treen, Corcoran told him, “that he would make
(Treen) serve in ranks in defiance of Her Majesty and all her damned forces”.
Officers relieved Treen of his money although he managed to escape before they
could force him into active service. He managed to make his way across the lines
to Richmond, from whence he appealed to Consul George Moore for assistance.
Before his case could find justice however, Treen decided of his own volition to
earn his living in Confederate service and withdrew his appeal lest he be captured
and suffer worse treatment on its account.154
William Treen’s story was a bizarre case of a Briton swept into the war on his
first day in America. Within three months he had been in the military charge of
both contending sections. Like many others, he freely chose to remove himself
from Her Majesty’s protection, intending to seek his own revenge. He literally
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became personally involved, while Her Majesty’s government worked to keep
Britain as a nation uninvolved. While Treen’s story is somewhat remarkable, his
experience of impressment was not. George Moore, Her Majesty’s consul and
head of the consular office in Richmond, forwarded Treen’s letter to Lord Lyons
in Washington. He had received many reports of Britons enrolled against their
will at Fort Monroe, Virginia after New York press gangs had filled them with
drink, or simply coerced them. Similar or worse outrages were even more
common in the South. James Clarke, who had arrived in New York on the British
packet ship American Congress, and William Gibbon, who had been a seaman
aboard the Great Eastern, escaped to Richmond on foot after such an ordeal,
penniless and distressed. Clarke wrote to Moore from Lybee prison’s hospital,
where was convalescing having his arrest in Richmond as a potential Union spy.
He complained that the officers at Camp Monroe had told him they would make a
soldier of Queen Victoria if she were there!155
Moore complained to Lyons that Britons held both in New York and Newport
News were often brutalized, stripped and robbed, and urged Lyons to exert
pressure against such practices. He also informed Lyons that, “A movement is
being made within the (Confederate) Congress now assembled here for the
enrollment of all foreigners”. While Moore was confident that it would not pass,
he requested that Her Majesty’s government send ships to Richmond to bring
Britons home should such a measure be adopted. As Moore believed, the move
did fail, but this was of little comfort. In early 1863 the Confederate government
still held out hope of recognition and appeared eager to treat resident Britons
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according to Her Majesty’s neutrality. In reality however, the Confederacy’s
plight was growing ever grimmer and official commitments to protect aliens were
becoming half-hearted. Moore informed Lord Russell that,
Of late the exercise of arbitrary power has been more vexatious than ever…. It
appears that enrolling officers in different parts of these states are exacting an
oath from every foreigner that he has not exercised any rights of citizenship… and
that it is his intention to return to his own country, otherwise he is liable for
conscription.
Ostensibly, such requirements of domicile and citizenship were little different
than any previously demanded. Moore claimed though, that interpretations of
domicile were increasing in harshness, even to the point that some enrolling
officers were considering the purchase of salt procured by the government as
exercising rights of citizenship.156
Moore was convinced that the recognition issue and the treatment of Britons
within the Confederacy were directly connected. He informed Russell in January
that he was certain the South could never be forced back into the Union. He also
highlighted the detrimental effects he believed reunion along pre-war lines of
tariff protection would have on British interests. Opinion in the South was,
according to Moore, “estranged from England, but not lost”. Southerners looked
more hopefully to France, but would welcome recognition from England. This
would bring trade, ship building contracts, and commercial dominance to Britain.
Moore even believed the Confederates could be persuaded to enact gradual
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emancipation. However, in the status quo Britons were unlikely to meet kindness
from frustrated and desperate Southerners. Congress was considering the question
of enrollment and it was, “proposed to bring a more stringent measure to make all
residents of the Confederate States liable to military duty”.157
As Moore predicted, this movement failed for the time being, but Moore, a
experienced diplomat serving with the Foreign Office since 1836, had judged the
climate of opinion correctly. Confederates were certainly feeling resentful at the
cold, dispassionate neutrality of the Crown. They were desperate for recruits and
frustrated at the refusal of foreigners to support a nation they benefited from.
More importantly, such unwillingness signalled an implicit refusal to
acknowledge the Confederacy as a nation state with any integrity of internal
authority. Numerous British consular officials had already been forced to
withdraw by Washington or their health and could not be replaced with full
consuls unless exequaturs were sought from Richmond. Through 1863
Confederate objections would force other leading consuls to withdraw, until
finally Davis expelled all foreign consuls accredited to Washington. As British
diplomatic manpower grew thinner, and restrictions placed upon consuls by
increasingly agitated Southern authorities grew more oppressive, Britons in the
South enjoyed shrinking protection while being subject to increasing abuse. When
the Davis administration realized that Britain would not extend recognition, they
finally cast off the offense of unauthorized foreign officials, refusing to allow
them to continue acting beyond their legal limits and affronting Confederate
sovereignty. The apparatus of Southern governments were closed to Britain and
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the sovereign Crown was left without access to subjects of whom it claimed to be
the final and only judge.
As Confederate forces in the field became more depleted and available
manpower for drafts dried up, enrolling officers squeezed the population of the
ailing republic with renewed vigor and harshness. As Southern courts issued
increasingly stringent and ungenerous rulings on questions of foreign exemption
British consular protests rose in response.
A War Department special order on February 7 1863 placed General John
Winder in charge of issuing passports to persons wishing to travel beyond
Confederate lines to the United States. Winder promptly instigated a policy of
sending Britons who had served any term in Southern forces to Moore in order to
have this fact, and the details of such terms, written on their passport. Moore
expressed a hope that United States authorities would treat these men generously
since they had generally been forced into service. However, he was concerned
because, “a peril is incurred by these discharged soldiers, in having my
endorsement (of the fact of their service) on their certificates”. Of course Winder
aimed to make it as difficult as possible for men who, to Confederate minds, had
entered into de jure citizenship from leaving the Confederacy when the new
nation needed their service most.158
By early 1863 harsh treatment of Britons was increasing at a pace. Moore
complained, “Justices of the peace in different parts now refuse to give affidavits
to British subjects living at a distance from consular assistance, in order to prevent
them from obtaining their certificates of nationality”. The neglect of the courts
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Justices of the Peace then left Britons at the mercies of enrolling officers, of
whom Moore complained, “Their cruelties of enrolling officers are beyond any
precedent”159
Acting Consul George Coppell at New Orleans reported the case of one James
Nelson who had been arrested and taken to a military camp where he claimed
exemption as a British subject. Major General R. Clarke, of whom Consul Magee
had so often complained, issued Nelson with a certificate of exemption that
referred to him as, “a nuisance to the Southern Confederacy” and urged all
persons to refuse him employment. Nelson had enough money to reach New
Orleans but told Coppell that many other Britons were trapped without financial
means to travel, “and are compelled to take up arms”. According to Coppell, if
state forces did not coercively muster men into service, Confederate forces would
do so. He requested reports from Magee’s districts, “in order that I might take
steps to prevent the enforcing of these illegal acts”.160
Coppell’s language was interesting because he was not referring to abuses of
Britons as ‘these illegal acts’ but Acts passed by the Louisiana Legislature on
January 3, and in Mississippi later that month. These Acts were for the enrollment
of all men aged 17 to 50 able to bear arms, “whether citizens of the state or
residents thereof, temporarily or permanently….” Coppell’s determination to
resist the laws indicated a denial of the rights of Louisiana and Mississippi to pass
whatever laws their legislatures saw fit. Of course, such opposition to state
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sovereignty was understandable coming from the consuls, considering the abuses
Britons suffered in the Confederacy by 1863.161
On April 4 1863, Representative Caleb Claiborne Herbert of Texas requested a
House committee of the Confederate Congress to investigate rumored atrocities at
Castle Thunder. Thunder, located on Carey Street in Richmond, was a high
security Confederate prison for political enemies such as spies and traitors. Moore
had heard appeals from many Britons incarcerated at Thunder, “constantly
suffering misery untold, the effects of which many of them will carry to their
graves”. Such torture was not confined however to jails for political enemies. R.
N. Belshaw, a British gentleman of Montgomery, was arrested and taken to
Tullahoma, Tennessee where he was abused, despite ill heath, for refusing to be
conscripted. Apparently, Confederates hung Belshaw from rafters by his thumbs,
his feet only touching the ground by the toe-tips. Only the constant appeals of his
sister at the War Department in Richmond and intervention by Moore secured his
release. The slowness of Assistant Secretary of War Judge John Campbell to act
indicated one of two things. Either enrolling officers were frequently able to
secure conscripts through inhumane acts without the War Department’s
knowledge, or worse still department officials were only willing to act on behalf
of distressed aliens after consular protest. Moore leaned towards the former
conclusion and expressed faith that Adjutant General Samuel Cooper was
‘indignant’ at the case. He hoped that the government would effectively curb the
enrolling officers’ powers. These hopes were never fulfilled.162
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In the same letter that he reported the Belshaw case, Moore named two other
distressed Britons, Mr. J. Kelly and Michael McNamara. Officers at Tullahoma
suspended Kelly by his heels with his head in water and one gashed McNamara
with an axe. Mr. McNamara had, “defended himself with repeated blows to the
enrolling officer’s head”, and was now in hiding in the Virginia borderlands,
pursued by cavalrymen with a warrant for his arrest for the charge of assault.
Consul Magee reported the case of one J. P. Turner, who had served as a twelvemonth volunteer and been released with consular papers of British nationality.
Turner was arrested and sent to Tullahoma where he too was abused and relieved
of $699 in cash and $120 in ‘notes of hand’.163
Cases of this nature were too common and by the spring of 1863, the frustrated
consuls were losing faith in Confederate goodwill. The vociferousness of British
consular protests and demands for official protection increased dramatically.
However, Her Majesty’s diplomatic frontline was more isolated and powerless
than ever. Russell glumly summated,
There can be no doubt that the representations of Mr. Consul Moore with respect
to the treatment of British subjects in the so-called Confederate States call for the
interference of this government, but in the current state of affairs and in the
absence of all diplomatic means of communication it is difficult to determine in
what manner or through what channel interference can most effectively be
extended.164
In June 1863 Peter McKinn, William Wing, and Joseph Goodsir filed suit in
Alabama for military exemption based on certificates of nationality issued by
consul Magee. When the case came before the Confederate district court, the
honorable W. G. Jones’ opinion asserted Confederate claims over domiciled aliens
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and undermined many arguments of non-domicile. Jones quoted De Vattel on
international law, stating that aliens are obliged to act out of gratitude in response
to the blessing and protection of host governments. De Vattel, and all other
accepted legal commentaries of the day, agreed that citizenship always bears an
obligation of defense. Domicile, according to Jones, was residence with the
intention to remain indefinitely. However, Jones stated that actions alone
demonstrate intent, not oral declaration. A vague statement of intent to relocate
was not actual relocation. Thus if a man demonstrated no active intent to move, he
was domiciled. Peter McKinn, William Wing and Joseph Goodsir had been in
Alabama fourteen, twelve and five years respectively. They carried on trades, held
no property back in Ireland and one had even married. While refusing to comment
on whether the Confederate government should allow consuls to remain without
exequaturs from Richmond, Jones did condemn the consuls for issuing certificates
of nationality based only on the verbal testimony of the individual. A War
Department order of August 1862 to the Commandant of Conscripts in Alabama
had instructed, “enrolling officers (to) not enroll foreigners unless they are
permanent residents. The oath of the party supported by the oath of one credible
witness is deemed to be sufficient proof in such cases”. Jones lamented that this
order had been, “the prolific parent of much oath swearing”. He believed that
many hundreds had consequently made such oaths, and blank affidavits had even
been printed. His ruling instructed enrolling officers at least to investigate the
certificates and cases of persons claiming exemptions, rather than allowing
consuls to exempt whomsoever they chose. He encouraged enrolling officers by
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stating, “I know of no law or treaty which authorizes foreign consuls to exempt
any person domiciled in this country from obedience to our laws”165
Fredric Cridland, who had moved to Mobile from Richmond, forwarded a copy
of Jones’ decision to Russell. Cridland confessed that Britons in Alabama and
Mississippi were, “(in) constant fear of new orders which may bring them within
the Confederate conscription law”. Cridland succinctly captured the grave reality
that Britons in the South were entirely at Confederate mercy.166
Jones’ decision was one of many Confederate court rulings adding up to a
growing weight of precedents stripping Britons of legal shelter. The South
Carolina court of appeals had ruled in Ainsley vs. Timmons in December 1861
that while host states could only exact military service from residents, alien
residents could leave any time. Those who did not leave were demonstrably
domiciled and therefore liable for service. In the spring of 1862, the Confederate
circuit court in Atlanta provided another important decision. Judge Hill
established his belief that foreign-born persons who had exercised rights of
citizenship should receive penitentiary sentences if they attempted to evade their
duties of service. The following year in February 24 1863, District Court Judge
Meredith decided in Richmond that any aliens who had enrolled as volunteers had
borne the obligations of citizenship, assumed nationality and were liable for
conscription. In July 1863, Judge A. G. Magrath handed down the most important
decision in this growing body of precedents. Mr. H. Spinken was a German man
resident in America for seven years. He had not naturalized but had enrolled in his

165

McKinn, Wing and Goodsir v. Alabama (9th Cir. Confederate States of America, 1862),
reported in Mobile Tribune, June 10 1863.
166
Cridland to Russell, July 13 1863, FO 115.

117

local militia before the war. Spinken’s defense council argued that the recent Act
of Congress declaring aliens liable for service in exchange for the protection they
enjoyed from their host government could refer only to domiciled aliens. Magrath
ruled however that he could not lay aside an Act of Congress for a general
principle of international law. If the Confederacy needed to defy the law of
nations to protect its community, it had the right to do so. There were, according
to McGrath, three classes of alien: residents, domiciles, and itinerants. War
Department orders of May 1861 and the Conscription Act of April 1862 had not
included domiciled aliens, but not because the Confederacy did not possess such a
right. The Confederacy alone would judge which of its residents were or were not
domiciled. Judge McGrath ruled that it had become necessary to ask aliens to pay
obligations due to their host.167
The Foreign Office had consistently presented appeals on behalf of British
interests in terms of rights and international law. However, British and
Confederate authorities alike knew that Her Majesty’s protection of her subjects
depended upon the cooperation of local authorities. The growing body of judicial
rulings unfavorable to the neutrality of resident Britons, and the increasing
desperation of enrolling officers, was matched in 1863 by a shift in the attitudes of
Confederate officials towards the consuls. As the Confederacy’s plight worsened,
the pragmatic and tentative but firm approach of the consuls, who overstepped
their legal limits of operations by addressing diplomatic matters and cases beyond
their constituencies, met with resistance. The Davis administration was
167
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decreasingly tolerant of the extra-legal, pseudo-diplomatic roles the consuls had
played. In 1863 the Confederate State Department prevented Lord Lyon’s from
appointing new, unauthorized consuls, banned direct communication between
consular agents and Washington, and finally expelled foreign consuls entirely.
On November 11 1862 Charles Walsh, President of the Bank of Mobile,
requested Magee’s assistance with the transfer of specie repayments for
Alabama’s state debts in London. Magee sent the specie out of Mobile on a
British Man of War in January 1863. When Her Majesty’s government learned of
this, Russell withdrew Magee because, “This transaction had the character, in the
eyes of Her Majesty’s government, of aiding one of the belligerents against the
other”. Writing to John Slidell in Paris on October 8 1863, Judah Benjamin
recounted in turn the progression of offensive acts the Foreign Office had
committed against the Confederacy. Benjamin felt that under international law
Russell was not justified in viewing Magee’s transfer of specie as favorable to one
belligerent. He believed that Magee’s real offense had been to aid Alabama in
honoring its debts, a necessary duty of sovereign and independent states, “which
happened to be displeasing the United States”.168
Benjamin had written a similar letter to James Murray Mason in London on
June 11 1863. In it he complained that the Foreign Office pursued inconsistent and
hypocritical policies damaging to the Richmond government, which Her Majesty
did not recognize, motivated by a commitment to maintaining friendly relations
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with the Washington government, which it did. In Benjamin’s mind this amounted
to neutrality that was far from neutral.
The British Government could regard Alabama only as part of the United States
in rebellion or as an independent state waging a lawful war: if the former, then the
United States was bound to aid neutral nations in the collection of just claims;
though it could not compel payment, it should interpose no obstacles thereto;
accordingly the consul’s action should have been approved by both Washington
and London. If the latter hypothesis were the correct one, as he maintained it to be
then the action of Lord Lyons savoured on this occasion rather unfriendly
cooperation with an enemy than of just observation of neutral obligations.169
British neutrality had always been a tentative waiting game. Refusing either to
rule recognition out or commit to supporting the United States’ claims to the
seceded states, the Palmerston administration had determined only to defend Her
Majesty’s interests. As the war progressed however, it was increasingly clear that
those interests would be best secured through cooperation with the Union.
Following secession, Jefferson Davis had faced consistent pressure to force
British recognition by expelling the consuls. On July 26 1861, Senator Louis
Wigfall of Texas had introduced a resolution for the Committee on Foreign
Affairs to demand that consuls accredited to the United States cease their
functions in Confederate ports. Numerous leading Southern papers such as the
Richmond Whig and the Charleston Mercury followed editorial lines extremely
hostile to the favor and liberality Davis extended the consuls. However, Davis
remained resolute. His administration interpreted state sovereignty theory
generously to allow consuls to continue their functions without new exequaturs,
despite the fact that their refusal to seek new exequaturs implicitly denied
Confederate legitimacy.
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After Magee’s departure the French consul Louis Portz acted as British consul.
This was an inconvenience at best and although Portz was able to register and
clear British shipping passing through Mobile, as a Frenchman he could hardly be
trusted with correspondence regarding national policy. Russell wrote to Lyons in
March directing him to appoint an acting consul to replace Magee. Lyons sent
Fredric Cridland from Richmond to Mobile in May. On May 18 1863, the
Richmond Whig reported that Cridland was preparing to leave the city with a full
consular appointment and an exequatur from Lincoln’s government. The Whig
lamented, “This intelligence… will not give pleasure to anyone in the South. To
be sure, we know that we have no national existence outside of our own fond
imaginations and that in the eyes of Great Britain we are still a part of the United
States”.170
Cridland assured the State Department that he had not received an exequatur
from Washington. The following day the Whig corrected its statements and
reported that Cridland was departing for Mobile as a private citizen to act
unofficially to defend British interests. Something the Confederacy could prevent
that only by expelling all Britons from the South. However, on June 6 1863,
Admiral Stephen Mallory, the Confederate naval secretary, telegraphed Richmond
informing the State Department, “The French Consul, Mr. Portz, in his official
capacity as acting English Consul, introduced me to Mr. Cridland, who has shown
me an official document, signed by Lyons, appointing him the acting English
Consul at Mobile. Am I to recognize him as such?” On June 2, the Commanding
Officer at Mobile, Dabney Herndon Maury, had accepted Cridland as acting
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consul. However, on June 7 Benjamin issued an order for Cridland to leave
Alabama and instructed Maury not to accept any official actions from him.
Cridland then wrote to Benjamin stating that he had denied only having received
an exequatur from Washington, not that he would be acting as consul in Mobile.
Cridland requested permission to remain in Mobile and take care of the consular
archive until the Foreign Office could secure its safety.171
Cridland hid his actions from Confederate authorities with deceptive half-truths
because his directions to act as British consul in Mobile were coming from Her
Majesty’s delegation to Washington. Confederate officials understandably insisted
that diplomatic appointments not predating secession required new commissions
from Richmond. In his letter to Mason on August 18 1863, Russell acknowledged
that Confederate officials were in no way bound to accept any consuls accredited
to Washington. However, he reiterated, “It is very desirable that persons
authorized by Her Majesty should have means of representing, at Richmond and
elsewhere in the Confederate States, the interests of British subjects who may be,
in the course of war, grievously wronged by the acts of subordinate officers”.
Russell expressed no sense of shame at having affronted Confederate pride and
sensibilities and he offered no apology. He made clear that Her Majesty’s
government would continue as long as possible to do whatever was in its power to
pursue British prerogatives by whatever means were necessary.172
Unsurprisingly, the Confederate State Department was tiring of such tactics.
Benjamin was certain that as long as consuls were under the guidance of Lyons
they would actively resist Confederate authority, cause unrest within the
171

Confederate State Department, Correspondence, p. 27; Bonham, British Consuls, p. 160.

122

Confederacy’s resident population, and shamelessly affront Confederate selfrespect. Therefore, on June 10 1863 Judah Benjamin sent a circular to all foreign
consuls stating that the President would no longer permit direct communication
between, “consular agents of foreign countries residing within the Confederacy,
and the functionaries of such foreign governments residing in the enemy’s line”.
Henceforth consuls were to, “communicate with their governments only directly
or through neutral countries”. 173
Davis and Benjamin consistently expressed a desire to act as a respectable and
mature nation, not employing dishonorable tactics such as forcing the hand of
other governments through aggression. These desires encouraged them to
entertain foreign consuls far longer than many observers thought wise. In the end,
events proved the critics right. The June 10 circular demonstrates the State
Department’s growing frustration with the British consuls’ stubborn and
ungrateful treatment of the Confederacy. Unfortunately for the Confederacy,
simply acting like an honorable and legitimate government could not convince the
Crown to recognize it as one.
Since Her Majesty’s government witheld recognition from the Confederacy,
Britain’s consuls could hardly be surprised if secessionist authorities ceased to
recognize them. As numerous full consuls were withdrawn or retired due to ill
heath, the Foreign Office was forced to replace them with acting consuls. Initially
Confederate authorities accepted the acting consuls with little fuss. Allan
Fullarton became acting consul in Savannah in June 1862, but Judah Benjamin did
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not request proof of his authority until June 1863. Increasingly however, the State
Department was reluctant to accept the authority of consuls it could not regulate.
In late January 1863 Commodore Duncan Ingraham attacked the blockading
fleet at Charleston and declared the blockade there lifted. On January 31, consul
Bunch and Captain J. S. Watson of the British man of war Petrel, who had
apparently gone five miles out of the harbor without seeing any Union vessel,
affirmed Ingraham’s claim. Admiral Samuel Dupont of the Union Department of
the Navy was assured that the reports were untrue, and the New York Times called
Ingraham’s claims, “Rebel fabrication”. Whether the report was given in good
faith at the time or not, it proved overstated. The blockade was successfully reestablished and, fearing an attack on the city, the Foreign Office withdrew Bunch,
who had been ordered out of Charleston by Lincoln’s government almost two
years earlier. Russell could not risk the displeasure of the United States should
Union forces find him there.174
Vice-consul H .P. Walker became acting consul in his place, and was
immediately challenged by cautious authorities. Russell wrote to Walker on April
4, directing him to appeal on behalf of Richard Wightman to the Confederate
military authorities at Wilmington who had interned Wightman’s British
registered schooner the Harkaway. The ship had originally been called the
Victoria, being registered to a Wilmington merchant from whom the United States
Navy had captured it and put it up for auction in Nassau, New Providence.
Walker’s letter to Brigadier General W. H. C. Whiting demanding release of the
vessel met with a vitriolic and curt response. Whiting informed Walker on May 11
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that he would await direction from Benjamin. “In the meantime,” Whiting teased,
“as Her Britannic Majesty’s government does not recognize the jurisdiction of the
Confederate States here, and the United States government claims it, perhaps it
would be as well to apply to the latter”.175
Whiting’s sarcasm was most astute. He and Walker both knew that Her
Majesty’s consuls had no hope of protecting British property in the South without
the blessing and goodwill of the de facto authorities. Walker was reminded of this
dependence in his first correspondence with Benjamin when, some weeks later, he
appealed on behalf of James Hurley. Hurley was a British subject who had
previously served twelve months as a Tennessee volunteer and recently been reenlisted against his will at Knoxville and sent to serve in Mississippi. Benjamin
replied that he would not answer the plea because the Charleston exequatur, which
predated secession and upon which consular activities in Charleston depended,
“was supposed to have reference solely to consular functions in Charleston or at
furthest, the state of South Carolina”. Benjamin requested proof of Walker’s
commission and right to act as consul in Charleston and would correspond no
further with him until he saw such.176
Walker forwarded his original vice-consular commission from 1860 to Moore
in Richmond, along with the correspondence from the Harkaway case, as
evidence for Russell’s approval of his assumption of consular responsibilities in
the Carolinas. He asked Moore to show these to Benjamin and to make appeal for
Hurley, “…for whom any day may be the last”. Walker was willing to do
whatever necessary to serve British interests, providing it was within the limits of
175
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Foreign Office policy. He stated to Moore on May 13, “frequent applications must
be made to the de facto government at Richmond, and it does not seem
unreasonable that the chief officer of that government enquire by what authority
the advocates of those persons who claim to be exempt… undertake to act”.
Walker had little choice. The complaints he had to present to Benjamin were often
from, “British subjects… within bordering states having no British consular
representative”. He needed Benjamin’s goodwill if the State Department was to
allow him to act beyond South Carolina.177
Unfortunately, Moore was in no position to help. Benjamin had recently
requested to see papers regarding Moore’s consular appointment but he had
refused to present them. He could hardly appear in person with Walker’s papers
but not his own. Moore informed Lyons that he would write independently to
Benjamin in appeal for Hurley without mentioning Walker and simply hope for
mercy. He then advised Walker to appeal on the Harkaway case in person, since it
was within what the Foreign Office considered his consular constituency. Walker
therefore traveled to Richmond and gained a personal interview with Benjamin on
June 8. Contravening State Department instructions, Walker sent a dispatch to
Lyons on June 22 that included a letter for Russell, and a copy of a letter he had
independently sent to Russell on June 13. He told Lyons that he had assumed the
responsibility of corresponding with Richmond from Moore, whom Benjamin had
recently expelled, and hoped that he had not overstepped his authority in so doing.
Walker also told Russell that he had chosen to submit his papers to Benjamin
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because, “it seemed to me highly important that my privilege of communicating
with the de facto government should not be interrupted”.178
In the letter to Russell, Walker recounted his appeal on behalf of Hurley.
Benjamin had informed the consul that, “it was not intended by the President that
the powers of the consuls be in any way extended”. Walker did express faith in
Benjamin’s unwillingness to allow injustice and a conviction that the State
Secretary would continue to be “glad to redress” any case that came to his
attention. Walker continued, “I will take the liberty of adding that the open
manner in which I have approached Mr. Benjamin appears to give him much
satisfaction”.179
In contrast to Walker’s willingness to cooperate as far as possible with
Confederate authorities, consul Moore reacted with rising frustration to the
changing climate within the Confederacy. He found the State Department to be
insincere, claiming a commitment to defend the personal liberty of alien guests
while in reality responding to consular appeals reluctantly, lethargically and with
decreasing favor. He reported to Lyons on February 26, “pressure against
foreigners under the Conscription Act is such as to render the position of the
consuls untenable”. What Moore meant by ‘untenable’ was that consuls were
forced to act with increasingly pronounced aggression and assertiveness in order
to protect Her Majesty’s neutrality in the persons of her subjects. Such a course
was bound to provoke a negative response from Confederate authorities. Moore
complained vehemently about Judge Meredith’s decision that British volunteers
were liable for reenlistment through conscription. He also reported that alien
178

Walker to Russell, June 13 1863, FO 115.

127

persons having worked on public works, such as earth works defending Richmond
(a duty the Foreign Office acknowledged aliens were liable to render) were being
deprived of their certificates of nationality and called citizens for having rendered
such basic obligations. The vital protective covers of consular certificates, even in
Richmond under Moore’s watch, were removed from Britons, “under every
imaginable pretext”.180
Away from Richmond things were even more difficult for Her Majesty’s
beleaguered subjects. Moore informed Lyons on March 5, that Justices of the
Peace were refusing affidavits for Britons living away from consular assistance,
“in order to prevent them if possible from obtaining certificates of nationality”.
Moore continued revealing his complete exasperation and disgust; “I have lived
thirty two consecutive years in despotic countries (1826 to 1858) without ever
witnessing to so much frightful, unmitigated and remorseless tyranny”.181
On February 16 1863, with Magee withdrawn, Moore presented an appeal
against the new Mississippi draft law, which covered all white males aged
eighteen to fifty, including non-resident aliens. Moore requested to know how a
law conflicting with the laws of Congress could stand. He also appealed for
Thomas Jones of Rankin county Mississippi whom officers had jailed, beaten and
abused for resisting the draft. Benjamin ignored these questions, responding only
with a demand for proof of the authority vested in Moore by Her Majesty to act in
such cases arising beyond the Virginia. Naturally, Benjamin would only accept
evidence pre-dating secession, and since Moore’s Foreign Office mandate to
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intercede when and wherever necessary for distressed Britons was a circumstance
of the war, he could not comply. Benjamin instructed Moore to cease interfering
in affairs beyond his legal constituency until such papers could be provided.182
By the early summer of 1863, the web of consular protection and assistance
available to Britons was thinner than ever. Poor health forced Richard Mure to
leave New Orleans in the spring of 1862, and by now it was a Union controlled
island in which Acting Consul George Coppell was isolated. The Foreign Office
had withdrawn Bunch and Magee, and Molyneux had returned home with ill
health. State Department opposition to Cridland’s move to Mobile had rendered
him impotent. Moore and Arthur Lynn (cut off from the rest of the Confederacy in
Galveston) were the only full consuls remaining. Communication beyond the
South with the Foreign Office was harder than ever, and independent actions by
the desperate cadre of consular representatives were decreasingly likely to find
favor. Moore had little choice but to continue representing cases of abuse against
Her Majesty’s subjects, but was not optimistic about the likelihood of cooperation
because Benjamin was still waiting for proof as to the extent of his consular
mandate.
On May 5 1863, Moore sent an appeal to the Department of State on behalf of
two British residents of Virginia, whom enrolling officers had drafted against their
will. Irishmen Nicholas Malony and Eugene Farrell had appealed to Moore on the
ground that they held certificates of British citizenship. Moore forwarded the case
to Benjamin without further investigation. Unfortunately for Moore, State
Department inquiries revealed that the men were far from non-domiciled aliens.
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Captain R. H. Catlett, Adjutant General of the 1st battalion of the Army of
Western Virginia, reported to Lieutenant Colonel George Edgar on May 25 that
both men had been in Virginia eight years. Both owned and cultivated farms and
had families residing thereon. Both had voted, and maintained no property back in
Ireland. Benjamin summated to Mason on June 6, “it is difficult to conceive a case
presenting stronger proofs of the renunciation of native allegiance and of the
acquisition of de facto citizenship…. It can scarcely be expected that we should,
by our own conduct, imply consent to the justice or propriety of (this) refusal of
recognition”.183
Moore’s implication that the Confederate State Department place higher onus
on a consular certificate of nationality than on an assumption of the privileges of
Virginian citizenship was exactly that; a refusal of recognition. Benjamin could
certainly not assent to it. On June 5, he revoked Moore’s exequatur and ordered
him out of the Confederacy. Although Moore acknowledged, “the law officers of
the Crown admit that Mr. Benjamin’s objection to my non-diplomatic charter,
however harsh in the circumstances, is legally sound” he insisted that Benjamin
had acted unfairly. Moore complained that he had been in correspondence with
the State Department since April 8 1863, when Congress had updated the
Conscription Act, making its provisions for aliens more stringent. Why had
Benjamin waited until June to make this, “unprecedented and unprovoked (act of)
aggression against the comity of nations if not against international law”?
Here again, a consular agent of the Crown criticized Confederate unwillingness
to act as a responsible nation, despite the fact that Her Majesty did not recognize
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them as such. Moore however, saw no hypocrisy in his criticism. He claimed
England had, “made great sacrifices to recognize the Confederacy as neutral”, and
blamed Davis’ government for undermining, “the sanctity of personal freedom”
by its, “merciless career of compulsory enlistment for its armies”. By these acts
they, “compel(ed) men to act in direct opposition to the proclamation of their
sovereign”. Moore informed Lyons that there were many Britons in workshops in
Virginia who were eager to leave, but to whom the Confederacy denied passports.
He requested that the Royal Navy send gunboats up the James River to rescue
them. Little wonder that Benjamin, after two years patiently hoping for
recognition, should react with anger to such overt denials of Confederate
legitimacy from within the fledgling republic’s own borders!184
The differences between Moore and Walker’s approaches to diplomacy in
1863 demonstrated the often personal and always uncertain nature of consular
relations with Confederate authorities. Within limits, consuls were forced to make
choices about their own courses of action. Corresponding with Washington across
Confederate lines, or London through the blockade was difficult. Problems
frequently demanded action more promptly than consuls could expect to wait for
instruction to arrive. The best they could do was try to balance the imperative of
protecting British interests with the necessity of maintaining amicable relations
with local authorities. Individual consuls frequently failed to keep that balance and
upset the Foreign Office, Lincoln’s government or the Confederacy. By mid 1863,
even Walker could not go as far as was necessary to please Benjamin. He was
unable to extend recognition. Benjamin repeated instructions to Walker not to
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correspond with Lyons, and to limit his appeals to cases arising within his
constituency. Thus, as the dangers facing Britons in the Confederacy grew more
threatening, the noose around consular necks grew tighter.
From the outset of the secessionist experiment Governor Joseph Brown of
Georgia was fastidious in his insistence upon Georgia’s right to draft men from its
resident citizenry according to the state’s own needs. Brown’s instructions for the
Georgia draft of 1862 stated clearly, “If he is an un-naturalized foreigner and he is
living under the protection of our government and laws, in these and all cases he is
bound to defend his domicile, and liable to be drafted by the state and compelled
to do so”. On July 17 1863, responding to Davis’ call for 8,000 Georgia troops to
be organized for local defense, Brown called for volunteers and threatened a draft
if necessary. Fullarton responded with letters challenging not only Georgia’s right
to muster Her Majesty’s neutral subjects, but the legitimacy of secessionist
governments and their right to wage war at all.185
Fullarton wrote to Brown on July 22 stating that Her Majesty admitted the
rights of host governments to claim service for internal order and, “to a limited
extent to defend against local invasion by a foreign power”. However, due to the
nature of this conflict, Her Majesty could not accept the right of Georgia to
compel service from Britons against the United States. Firstly, the Union would
treat captured Britons as traitors and rebels, not prisoners of war. Secondly, such
service would be, “disobeying the order of their legitimate sovereign”. Her
Majesty considered the conflict to be a civil war, and by implication, the
Confederate struggle was not a repulsion of foreign invasion. The British
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government could not accept any foreign state interposing its judgments between
the Crown and British subjects. On the contrary, Fullarton subtly asserted the
rights of Britons themselves to judge over Georgia. He argued that service was
unreasonable since the commercial reasons for which Britons had settled in
Georgia were undermined by secession and war. Georgia had therefore denied
resident Britons the lifestyle they had sought and come to expect.186
Brown responded on August 8 with a protest that the regiments being formed
were specifically for the purpose of local defense and police work, and that
international law admitted Georgia’s right to demand such service of alien
residents. Brown was no more able to accept a rejection of the obligations of
citizenship by Georgia residents than Fullarton was able to acquiesce in the
usurpation of British subjects. He argued that Britons had an equal obligation in
this and all such matters of citizenship.
Many who claim to be Her Majesty’s subjects in this state are large slaveholders,
whose danger of loss of property… is as great as… to the citizens of this state….
We cannot afford to maintain among us a class of consumers… who refuse to take
up arms for interior and local defense.
Such property, and the life and freedom of all Britons in Georgia, was protected
and extended by Georgia’s grace. Georgia gave protection to Britons.
Furthermore, Georgia allowed the consuls to remain, granting Britons double
protection. Brown made clear, “less than the service now demanded will not in
future be demanded in case they choose to remain in the state and enjoy its
protection”.187
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Brown argued further that it was not secession which destroyed ‘the
commercial reasons’ that had attracted Britons to Georgia, but Her Majesty’s
failure to recognize the Confederacy. Under international law, no country could
blockade its own ports against neutral commerce. By refusing recognition, Britain
implied that the South remained part of the United States. Recognition of the
blockade was therefore inconsistent, arbitrary and self-serving. Brown refused to
allow resident Britons to follow the national example. He was adamant that, “no
self-imposed obligation can free the subjects of Her Majesty who choose to
remain from the higher obligation which… they are under to the state for
protection while they remain”.188
In his second letter on August 17 1863, Fullarton found it necessary to make
explicit what he only implied in his first appeal. Her Majesty could not accept the
service of her subjects, “in a civil war like that raging on this continent”. Fullarton
informed Brown that he was issuing instructions to Britons forced to face United
States troops to throw down their arms and refuse service. These subjects did not
have any part in deciding secession and could not be expected to bear its burdens.
Fullarton admitted that any Britons owning slaves, as forbidden to aliens by the
laws of Georgia, had forfeited their neutrality. However, he insisted that cases of
residency not made clear by property were a matter for Her Majesty’s judgement,
depending upon testimonies of individual Britons, not a matter for Georgia.189
Naturally, such open denial of Georgia’s sovereignty provoked Fullarton’s
displeasure. He responded on August 26 in a suitably round manner complaining,
“you virtually deny that the United States is a foreign power, and claim that
188
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Georgia is still a component part of (that) government”. Such insinuations were
not the best way to curry favor with local authorities, and Brown made clear that
he was tired of the consuls. He wondered to Fullarton whether, “(you have) been
influenced in your persistence of this error by the forbearance of the
Government… of the Confederate States in permitting Her Majesty’s consuls to
remain among us”. Brown was frustrated at this graciousness, which implied a
lack of conviction by the Davis administration in its own sovereignty and
legitimacy. He sarcastically instructed Fullarton to follow the logic of his
offensive insinuations to their end. “If your pretensions be correct then your
appeal for protection of British subjects resident within this state should have been
made at Washington and not to me”. Brown refused to allow Britons to remain in
Georgia and “exempt themselves” from performing the obligations of citizenship.
Only Georgia itself could admit or exempt residents from contractual citizenship.
He therefore warned that Britons throwing down their arms in state service, “will
be promptly dealt with as citizens of this state would be should they be guilty of
such dishonorable delinquency”. Brown reminded Fullarton that Georgia’s courts
were as open to resident aliens as to citizens, and that any who refused to accept
Georgia’s protection were free to leave.190
On September 12 1863, Fullarton wrote to Brown again on behalf of two
British brothers, J. D. and F. M. Keily, enrolled in the state draft. He requested
they be discharged and given thirty days to remain in Rome while tying up their
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affairs before departing the state. Two days later Brown responded, “This
permission will be granted cheerfully upon the production of sufficient evidence
to me that such persons are British subjects”. Just as Brown refused to
acknowledge Confederate rights to access Georgians except through state
authority, he accepted no representation for aliens within Georgia not coming
through full, legitimate and honorable relations with the state. Brown always
presented himself as a constitutionalist and a conservative. He was jealous for
Georgia’s rights and sovereignty and took every opportunity to defend them from
usurpers, and to attempt to take back any rights previously eroded. Brown and
other State Rights ideologues such as the Robert Barnwell-Rhett faction argued
that they were the only true and fair defenders of the letter of American
constitutional law. They seem radical in hindsight not because they were
revolutionaries advancing a radical change, but because they resisted the tide of
history. Brown asserted that Georgia had final authority over all persons within its
borders. Conflict with Fullarton was as much the result of his extreme
conservative-constitutionalist views as were his struggles with the Davis
administration.191
In light of the open contempt that Fullarton had shown to Brown and
secessionist Georgia, the public disgust at his continuing presence in Savannah
was unsurprising. Southern newspapers led the outcries against the consuls. The
Richmond Whig, an organ favoring Confederate centralization, reminded readers
that states were not constitutionally able to make treaties or engage in diplomacy
and that, “The whole difficulty in this matter arises from the failure of the
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Confederate Government to vindicate their sovereignty by a withdrawal of (the
consuls’) exequaturs”. The Southern Recorder of Milledgeville, Georgia
commented, “The letters show some temper on both sides; but those of Mr.
Fullarton are insulting. He not only ignores the existence of the Confederate
Government… but he decides that this is a civil war and incidentally that the
authorities with whom he does communicate are rebels and traitors”. Henry
Hotze’s London Index blamed Fullarton for being rash and practically ensuring
that, “the Confederate Government will refuse to allow any British consuls to
reside within its jurisdiction”. Hotze asked, “Who is to be responsible for (British
subjects’) protection? Mr. Lincoln? Mr. Lincoln has no power to protect them”.
Here Hotze captured the deep frustration of Southerners that London continually
turned its face at the flagrant reality of de facto Confederate sovereignty.192
Fullarton soon discovered that the State Department resented his sentiments as
strongly as Brown. He wrote to Benjamin on October 1 protesting the Georgia
draft, and raising the case of, a Briton resident in Columbus, J. C. Peters. Fullarton
had issued Peters papers of nationality, but state officers had regardless forcefully
enrolled and sent him to Braxton Bragg in North Georgia. A further letter two
days later added Alexander Pratt, Anthony Cadman, Michael Riley, Henry
Stephenson and William Gray to the appeal. Instead of responding with the
courtesy and ostensible compliance of earlier years, Benjamin issued an order on
October 8 revoking the exequaturs of foreign consuls, expelling them from the
Confederacy. With accusatory tones Benjamin opined, “it appears that the
consular agents of the British government have been instructed not to confine
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themselves to an appeal for redress, either to the courts or to this government…
but they assume the power of determining for themselves whether enlisted
soldiers of the Confederacy are properly bound to its service”. Benjamin called
this, “an assumption of jurisdiction by foreign officials within the Confederacy”.
Yet despite the deep and obvious offense Fullarton had caused, he, like Moore,
remained unrepentant. Fullarton had complained to Russell on August 22 1863
that the draft was unnecessary since Georgia had enough native manpower. He
believed that leaving the state was not a realistic alternative in most cases due to
the blockade and Union lines. Brown had no right to demand Britons either
perform service or choose an unavailable alternative. Following the revocation of
his exequatur Fullarton waxed lyrical against Brown, accusing him of,
“determination not only to force all British subjects into service but also to compel
the greater number now in this state to become citizens against their will”.193
The consuls’ constantly implicit and occasionally explicit denials of
Confederate legitimacy were so odorous for being immediate, continuous
reminders of Her Majesty’s refusal to recognize the hopeful republic. James
Mason had been in London nearly two years when Benjamin issued orders for his
withdrawal on August 4 1863. Historians have often commented on the obvious
irony that he was nearer to successfully gaining recognition by not arriving there
than he came subsequently. The Union naval captain Charles Wilkes of the San
Jacinto captured Mason and John Slidell under the British flag leaving Havana in
October 1861. The angry clamors for vindication of national honor in Parliament
and the British Press seemed for a moment to point to war, but Russell was wiser
193
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and more cautious than most. After some months of tension he accepted a halfapology from Seward along with the release of the Confederate envoys. When
Mason arrived in London he was granted his first and only private interview with
the Foreign Secretary. At his private residence, Russell coolly told Mason that
Britain would have done the same, “for any two Southern Negroes” taken under
the national flag.194
Mason and Slidell had been presented to the captain-general of Cuba by the
British consul there as ‘gentlemen of distinction’, not Confederate officers.
London society regarded and treated Mason only as a private individual, tolerated
at dinner parties and social occasions. Never once did Her Majesty’s government
acknowledge him officially or allow him into any government premises. In March
1862, Parliament debated a motion supported by William Gregory, the
Conservative Anglo-Irish magnate, to declare the blockade ineffective. Russell
and Palmerston however, knowing that this would be a major step towards
recognition, recoiled from such precipitousness. In a February 15 dispatch to
Lyons reprinted in the Times Russell argued,
(if) a number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port, sufficient
really to prevent access to it or to create an "eminant danger" of entering it or
leaving it, and that these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, (the
blockade is legal). 195
This doctrine of “eminant danger” was upheld by parliamentary ballot and Mason
and his friends in parliament never again came so close to securing recognition. In
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August 1863 the Richmond Whig lamented, “How humiliating it must be to every
citizen of the South now in England, to witness the contrast in official standing
presented by Mr. Adams and Mr. Mason”196
In 1863 Mason was finally withdrawn, as frustrated, bitter and desperate as the
South to which would return. Mason received Benjamin’s instructions for his
withdrawal in late September and immediately wrote to Lord Russell quoting
Benjamin’s statement that Britain clearly, “has no intention of receiving you as an
accreddited minister of (the Confederacy) near the British court”. Benjamin
complained that Her Majesty had declined recognition despite offers of treaty and
efforts towards, “friendly relations between the two governments”. Reprinting this
letter, the Southern Banner celebrated Mason’s withdrawal, beginning its
editorial, “At last after suffering humiliation and deep mortification…” 197
Mason’s withdrawal was quickly followed by the expulsion of the consuls.
When Fullarton’s dispatches of October 1 and 3 reached the State Department in
Richmond, President Davis was en route to Atlanta to visit General Bragg.
Benjamin was finally out of patience with the consuls and called the cabinet
together. He proposed taking exectutive action for this strong diplomatic move.
Although the President was unreachable, Benjamin knew Davis would support
him. The two men had grown close and the President trusted Benjamin as a
competant and loyal ally. Accoridng to Bonham, “It was probably an easy matter
for politicians and journalists to induce the majority to think a good way of
securing recognition, as well as a proper assertion of self-respect, would be to
dismiss the consuls”. Benjamin and Davis expressed consistant desire to act
196
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honorably. They sought recognition through diplomatic entreaty, not coercion or
ultimatum. Many critics of the Davis administration in the Senate, such as the propeace Henry Foote faction, and the ultra-nationalist Louis Wigfall faction,
opposed State Department policy towrads Europe as an embarrasing waste of
energy. With their friends in Richmond growing scarse, and the military situation
worsening, recognition had continued to offer one glimmer of hope.198
Benjamin and Mason had held that hope longer and more passionately than
anyone. Benjamin’s family had arrived in the South as recently as 1816. He had
been born a British subject on Saint Croix, where his parents had moved from
London. He maintained an awareness of his British origins his whole life, and fled
to London after the war. It is little wonder that Britain’s stand-offish caution
caused such heartache, bitterness and embarrasment for the would-be-nation
which had embarked upon its revolution with such arrogant confidence of
England’s dependence upon its wealth.199
On August 28 1862, a motion was sent to the Confederate Judiciary Committee
to inquire whether consuls were legally entitled to extend exemption from military
service. Such actions, it was said, allowed exempted aliens freedom to aquire
property, “to the demoralization of adopted citizens”. A bill introduced on January
17 1863 to enroll persons of foreign birth to the army was considered until March
30, when it was killed in the Judiciary Committee. Another bill to conscript aliens
was considered from April 4 until April 24 1863 , with Virginia representative
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John Baldwin complaining that Richmond was becoming, “a city of refuge for
foreign adventurers”. Consular protests and the hope of recognition barely held
back this rising tide of pressure. After the expulsion of the consuls there was no
court of appeal beyond the secessionist governments open to anyone within the
sovereign Confederacy. In December 1863, Senator Albert Brown, former
governor of Mississippi, introduced a motion for a Presidential decree giving all
foreigners of conscription age sixty days to choose military service or leave the
Confederacy. Finally, on February 17 1864, a revised Conscription Act passed
covering white males eighteen to forty-five making no arrangements for alien
exemption.200
In stark contrast to the troubled plight of aliens stranded in the South, Her
Majesty’s subjects within the United States benefitted from improving relations
between Washington and London. Confederate fortunes on the field proved to
Palmerston’s ministry that only the sovereign government at Washington could
guarantee and extend protection for British interests in America. Recognition was
out of the question and as a result, the US War Department issued an order
requesting from consuls the names of exempt Britons in each enrolling district.
The order began,
As complaints have been made that errors have occurred in enrolling the national
forces, by ommision of persons whose names should have been enrolled, and
addition of persons who, for reasons of alienage and other reasons, should not
have been enrolled, it is desireable that this department should have such
information as may be necessary in order to do justice to all parties.201
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Directing consul Wilkins’ continued efforts to secure the release of British
prisoners from the Department of Mississippi on December 4 1863, Lyons
recounted a personal meeting with William Seward. Seward continued to refuse
any absolute right to the Foreign Office because of the, “large number of such
cases”, but he had assured Lyons of Union commitment to justice. Lyons therefore
encouraged Wilkins to continue making personal requests when he was certain of
the appealant’s subject status. On December 9, Lyons wrote to Russell regarding a
Canadian man, Peter Anderson, being held as a prisoner after being forced into
Confederate service. Lyons expressed a lack of confidence in this case, despite the
injustice of Anderson’s treatment at Confederate hands, because there was
insufficient proof available as to his status. Lyons told Russell, “I have informed
Mr. Wilkins that I deem it avisable to abstain from sending in to the Federal
Government applications resting only on the assertions of the prisoner”. Such
willingness to accept Union rights and legal authority over British subjects was
dramatically at odds with the British attitude to Confederate rights and
authority.202
Ella Lonn summarized the development of alien conscription in the
Confederacy thus, “The Secretary of War interpreted the (Conscription) Act to
mean to include among the conscripts all who had aquired domicile in the
Confederate States. The whole issue then turned on the definition of domicile”.
Through War and State Department orders, personal decisions of military and
enrollment officers, judicial decisions, state militia legislation, national policy and
finally Confederate legislation, the South steadily closed the loop holes of
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exemption for aliens. Furthermore, as the Confederate States became a military
society the war effort dominated economic, political and social life in every way.
Life for unenrolled men of fighting age became very difficult. After a long battle
against conscription William Watson, a Scotsman who had volunteered for twelve
months immediately after secession, was discharged in July 1862. He returned to
civilian life to find most ordinary business suspended and employment scarce. The
skepticism and contempt he received, combined with a lack of alternative
employment and the difficulty of leaving the Confederacy led Watson to realize,
“that under a military despotism the safest and best place was in the army”. After
only two months of freedom he rejoined his regiment.203
Many Britons left the seceeded states when the war began. Others found their
way out across the lines or through the blockade. Many however were trapped or
chose to play a dangerous waiting game, hoping to avoid the war. These men then
called upon consular protection when conscription became a reality. The consuls
never failed to represent cases of abusive acts they considered to be illegal against
persons they considered to be subjects. However, Her Majesty could not interpose
British sovereignty in cases of persons whom the Foreign Office knew to be
domiciled. Magee was instructed in August 1862 that he could not appeal for
compensation for British owned cotton destroyed by the de facto government in
pursuit of the war. In July 1864 Britons living under martial law in Memphis were
informed that Her Majesty’s government could not interfere in the operation of
laws of foreign states, and that persons wanting British protection should
discontinue residence in areas under such military control. When Joseph Hansard,

203

Ella Lonn, Foreigners, p. 388.

144

resident twenty-five years in Georgia, was preparing to leave London and return
to the South he asked Russell what protection he could hope for from Her Majesty
if threatened with conscription upon his return. Russell told Hansard he was
returning to Georgia completely at his own risk.204
Her Majesty’s consuls in the Confederacy, guided by the Foreign Office,
defended British subjects and property as well as could have been expected. They
demonstrated flexibility, wisdom and courage in an increasingly violent military
society. In Union territory, consuls communicated openly and directly with local
authorities without worrying that their wording or manner might cause major
offense. Ultimately however, in the North or South could consular or diplomatic
officials act on any right that was not recognized and conceeded by the
government claiming internal hegemony and authority in that territory. British
sovereignty could not be vindicated, or individual subjects accessed, unless
through the apparatus of a recognized fellow sovereign state. The only suitible
state with which to deal proved to be the Union. In the end, the diplomacy of the
Civil War proved just as firmly as its domestic context, that the federal authority
created by the constitutional convention at Philadelphia had come of age on the
American continent. These United States became this United States, plural
became singular; ‘e pluribus unum’.
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Epilogue

By May 1865 the Confederacy had crumbled to absolute chaos. Richmond was
taken, the Carolinas had been burned and, according to Judah Benjamin, the total
number of troops the Confederacy could have mustered was (an optimistic)
30,000. Davis’ cabinet was riding fugitive along the back roads, making for Texas
in the hope of redeeming the East from the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy.
Benjamin, saddle-sore and bereft of hope, decided to bid his chief and friend a sad
goodbye and headed south, alone, for Florida. Benjamin had a small amount of
gold, which he sewed into his coat, and traveling in the disguise of a destitute
farmer he slowly wound his way southwards. Some Confederate sympathizers
aided him onto a boat taking Florida’s waterways towards the Gulf. At one point
of this journey the boat’s ex-Confederate Captain hid Benjamin in the kitchen,
disguised as a Jewish cook, when federal troops came aboard looking for
Confederate fugitives. Benjamin, who was by that point under suspicion of
complicity in the Lincoln assassination, had quite a price on his head and his flight
was, as he later recorded in a letter to his sister, a nervous and desperate trial.205
From South Florida Benjamin and two guides headed to the Bahaman island of
Bimini in a “small boat”. There he boarded a cargo sloop which soon sank,
leaving him and two black seamen to cross 35 miles of sea in a skiff with one oar
and only a pot of rice to eat. From Nassau, Benjamin took a schooner for Havana
which caught fire within ten hours of its departure. When Benjamin finally
reached London his ordeal had lasted four months and cost him $1,500 in gold. He
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was down, but not out. Benjamin had always had an astounding work ethic and
took to learning law in London as vigorously at fifty-five as he had as a young
man in New Orleans. He learned the Barrister’s profession at Lincoln’s Inn and
gained admission to the Bar in 1866. He published a treatise on the law of sales in
1868, which is still studied by law students today. He was admitted to the Queen’s
council in 1872, which allowed him to argue cases in the Privy Council and House
of Lords. Less than a decade after arriving broken and destitute, a refugee from
the South’s failed attempt to grasp sovereignty, Benjamin was a wealthy,
influential and celebrated lawyer. In 1879 Benjamin, by then retired in Paris with
his long estranged wife and daughter, Natalie and Ninette St. Martin, told a New
York Times reporter that, “he was born what he was now- an Englishman”! He
died in 1884 and was buried in the Parisian, Catholic, Pere Lachaise cemetery
where only a plaque added to his grave by the United Daughters of the
Confederacy in 1938 marks the site as worthy of memory.
Benjamin biographer Eli Nevins wrote that Benjamin was a gambler and a
tireless worker. Always busy, always composed, and always at his best with his
back against the wall. He had risen as a lawyer to the top of Louisiana politics and
had served in the United States Senate against the odds. He stuck out as a foreign
born Jew in a nativist, Christian South. Like many Southerners, he opposed
secession publicly as late as ten days before Louisiana left the Union. However,
with the decision made, Benjamin threw his chips in with the Southern cause. He
gambled and labored with full strength for independence. He told the Senate on
January 26 1861,
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When history shall have past stern sentence on the erring men who have driven
their unoffending brethren from the shelter of their common home… your
children shall hear repeated the familiar tale… and will glory in their lineage from
men of spirit as generous and of patriotism as high hearted as ever illustrated or
adorned the American Senate.
After his flight and fresh start in London Benjamin sent for his personal papers
and burned them, fearing harsh treatment in the court of history. He never spoke
or wrote of the South and he never went back. The Civil War forced the former
Confederate States to swallow their pride, re-enter the Union, and accept the
sovereignty of Washington. At the same time, Benjamin also took on new
nationality. His personal reconstruction, his new identity and new history, and his
fresh start from poverty after the failed gamble stand as a metaphor for the
Confederacy. It is especially pointed and ironical that the very man who expelled
Her Majesty’s consuls for their defiance of Confederate citizenship and
sovereignty should revert to his British citizenship. The legal profession accepted
his admission to the Bar because his American citizenship was conferred upon
him in his minority at the will of his father. His father’s naturalization thus,
“entitled him to all the rights of a citizen of the United States without abjuring his
native allegiance”. Now that Benjamin was willing to bow the knee to the Crown,
Her Majesty was happy to accept and claim this one-time adversary as a
subject.206
The Civil War was a conflict made of claims, contested claims and counterclaims to the loyalty and allegiance of the citizenry of eleven states. Its origins
were fundamentally constitutional and legal, and its substance was equally legalconstitutional. Behind the guns and warfare, there were battles of political will
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over conscription and civil liberties in both the United and Confederate States. In
the same way the over-arching diplomatic struggle over European recognition was
underpinned by a concurrent debate over the allegiance and legal-constitutional
status of individual persons. In the end, militarily, politically and diplomatically,
the forces of centralization dominated the conflict. In both sections, the federal
centers grew to control mobilization, economics and national politics. Lincoln and
Davis alike corroded the prerogatives of the states in the name of freedom and
victory. Similarly, both Confederate and Union administrations demanded the
agents of foreign governments residing within their territories represent their
interests and protect their dispersed citizens through a recognition of the
dominance and sovereignty of the federal center over its territory.
Benjamin was one of those contested citizens and he claimed Confederate and
Southern citizenship. He rendered the services this citizenship obliged of him with
all his available energy. Ultimately however, the fledgling nation state for which
he so tirelessly labored was unable to vindicate its own claims or reciprocate the
loyal service of its would-be citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment is therefore the
truest, most profound out-working of that conflict. One of the first lasting
alterations to the national government upon cessation of the war was an
unequivocal assertion of authority over all citizens of every state by the federal
center. Never again could any opponents of Washington claim to be the true heirs
of the Constitution. Benjamin’s defection to a new life under Her Majesty’s
sovereignty in England demonstrates the limits to that part of sovereignty
ideology which states that individuals are the subjects of their ‘legitimate
206
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sovereign’ wherever they go. In time, movement will always erode the visible and
legal ties of sovereignty. The Britons who resided within America could only
remain legally ‘British’ if American governments chose to allow them to do so.
Likewise, Benjamin’s flight from the South was necessarily a flight not only from
America, but also from American citizenship and into the British citizenship of his
birth, which time and space had made so distant.
For years after the war, the State Department attempted to press the British for
compensation for damage done by the English built CSS Alabama. There can be
no doubt that if evidence had surfaced linking Benjamin directly to Lincoln’s
death that extradition proceedings would have followed. Benjamin himself might
have become a personal battleground in a microcosmic struggle of sovereignty
between London and Washington. Fortunately for him, he was able to live out his
days in peace. Like all gamblers, he must often have re-lived that one game in
which he seemed to have so strong a hand, decided to bet it all but contrived to
lose. The British had waited, hedging their bets, holding their chips until the
game’s course became clear. They bet, in the end, on the winner. Lincoln, though
he himself did not outlive the war to see old age as Benjamin and Davis did, was
the real winner. In a war that cost America over half a million lives and countless
dollars of wealth, the very life of the Union was collateral in a high-stakes hand
that finally earned Washington undisputed hegemonic sovereignty within the
United States. No other sovereign on earth, external or internal, historic or
pretender, can have any claim on any resident in these states, even its own

Benjamin, p. 334.

150

citizens, without first approaching the throne of the great American empire at
Washington.
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